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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Introduction to the Problem 
1. Current Epistemology 
The discussion in current epistemology primarily concerns a lively debate between 
externalism and internalism. Internalism, broadly speaking, is the view that in order to have 
knowledge an agent must have access to one’s justificatory reasons. Their view is rooted in the 
classical view of knowledge presented by Plato. For Plato, justification for some belief (the 
reasons for why the belief is true), one’s holding of that belief, and that belief’s being true are all 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for knowledge.1 Perhaps the primary motivation for 
most internalists, in regards to their accepting a view which is heavily based on this classical 
approach, is that the classical approach is meant to distinguish knowledge from mere opinion and 
lucky guesses.  Suppose Ted guesses that his friend Bob is at work but he has no reason for 
thinking it. And suppose that it just so happens that Bob is at work. Should we say that Ted knew 
it? Most would say “No.” We seem to just recognize that knowledge is something more than true 
belief. Justification is meant to be the reason/s one has for thinking the given belief is true.    
Externalism, once again in very general terms, denies that access to the reasons that make 
a belief true is necessary for knowledge.2 Reliability, the main concern for most externalists, 
means the process which produces the belief produces mostly true beliefs. So if the process 
which produces the belief is reliable and the belief is true then the agent has knowledge.  
                                                     
1 Plato, “Meno,” in Ancient Greek Philosophy, edited by S. Marc Cohen, Paricia Curd, and C. D. C. Reeve 
(IN, Hackett 2011) 264 97e-98a. 
 
2 Although some externalists would maintain that such access may be necessary in some cases. 
Nevertheless they hold that it is not necessary for all cases and this is enough to label them as externalists.   
2 
Externalists are more varied in terms of what motivates their theories. Space does not permit us 
to go into detail on these factors. The purpose of the paper is not an elaboration of the various 
externalist views. However, a few examples may be helpful. Some externalists think that there 
are many beliefs which we are rational in holding and have a right to claim as knowledge 
without any justificatory reasons (e.g. belief in other minds or belief in God).3 Most think that for 
some reason or other a belief’s being produced in a reliable manner is all that is needed.4   
Perhaps the primary reason for this debate between internalism and externalism is due to 
what is known as the Gettier problem. Gettier problems are cases where an agent has 
justification, true belief, and the agent holds belief on account of the evidence available to the 
agent, yet the beliefs being true has nothing to do with the agent’s justificatory reasons.5 (The 
Requirement for justification, true belief, and that belief’s being true is known as the tripartite 
criterion for knowledge. Gettier problems seem to show that the traditional tripartite model of 
knowledge fails to distinguish between lucky guesses and knowledge.) The internalists have 
largely attempted to remedy the problem by specifying a fourth criteria which will serve to 
differentiate between the two. Five decades, full of such attempts, have yet to provide a single 
likely candidate. However, externalist positions have fared little better. Gettier problems can be 
constructed for them as well. In these cases a belief is true and produced by reliable processes, 
but the belief’s being true has nothing to do with the reliability of the process which generated 
                                                     
3 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, (New York Oxford University Press, 2000), chapter 6.  
 
4 David Armstrong and Alvin Goldman are motivated by a materialist metaphysic to this conclusion. And 
Plantinga holds this as well on the condition that the belief’s production, on top of being reliable, is a process which 
is part of a design plan aimed at truth. See David Armstrong, “The Thermometer-Model of Knowledge,” in 
Knowledge, ed. Sven Bernecker and Fred Dretske (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 72-85, Alvin Goldman, 
“Discrimination and Knowledge,” in Knowledge, ed. Sven Bernecker and Fred Dretske (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 86-102 and Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 154ff. 
 
5 Edmund Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”  Analysis 23, no. 6 (1963) 121-123. 
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the belief.6  Furthermore, externalists seem to still be have trouble dealing with Plato.7 The 
likelihood of either side specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge seems 
to be low.  
This thesis will introduce certain aspects in the thought of Edmund Husserl as a sort of 
third option.8 Husserl’s work was centered on cognition in general and the possibility of 
knowledge in particular. His detailed analysis of cognition has application to epistemology and 
addresses in great depth an area which in the current discussion is often tertiary and shallow at 
best. Little is said about what cognition essentially is in the current discussion, though much 
might be assumed about it. Husserl’s work on the essence of cognition may provide insight into 
how to move forward in the current discussion.  
Furthermore, it is argued that in both internalist and externalist camps there is a common 
assumption about cognition which Husserl argues forcibly against. This assumption is that 
thought, or cognition, is essentially linguistic. (The notion that ‘thought is essentially linguistic’ 
                                                     
6 For a nice discussion and some examples of this see: Linda Zagzebski, “The Inescapability of Gettier 
Problems,” The Philosophical Quarterly vol. 44 no. 174 (1994), 65–73.  
 
7 Plato seems to show us that we need reasons. If Ted believes that his friend Bob is currently at work 
because he usually works at this time, and Bob really is at work, this still seems like a lucky guess. The ‘usually’ 
here denotes a probability (we can assign whatever value we want to it, e.g. .5<, or .75<. And most of us seem to 
want to say that such guesses are not knowledge. But what is the difference in this case and a case where belief 
forming mechanism X causes Bob to believe that Ted is at work and this mechanism has a probability of producing 
a true belief greater than .5 or .75? There seems to be a need for something more than probability or likelihood here.  
 
8 In what sense Husserl is a third option will be clarified later but a brief explanation may be helpful here. 
Let us call the set of Internalist approaches I and the set of Externalist approaches E. Husserl’s work, strictly 
speaking, is on cognition not epistemology. Thus the argument is not for H, a Husserlian approach to epistemic 
issues, in distinction from I and E. But rather that by starting with a Husserlian view of cognition we wind up with a 
range of approaches to epistemic issues. Let us call these I’ and E’. Husserl does not force us into a specific view or 
even a specific camp, e.g. I or I’ only. It should also be pointed out that some views within E or I might be entirely 
excluded from E’ or I’. An externalist view such as Goldman’s which seeks to naturalize epistemology, hence 
requiring a materialistic view of cognition, will not work with a Husserlian view of cognition. Again due to the 
limitations on this thesis exactly what theories can be combined with a Husserlian approach to cognition and which 
ones cannot is something which lies outside the scope of this paper.  All of this shows that this “third approach” is 
more like a new foundation which allows for many new approaches which to some extent mirror the current “two 
approaches.” 
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means that thought requires the use of language.) Whatever else thinking may be, when we do it 
we do it in or with language. This assumption about thought means that whatever justification 
may be it is linguistic (that justification involves clear and effable propositions).9 This thesis 
holds that the rejecting of this assumption is critical to advancing the discussion past the current 
stalemate. 
In order to provide a foundation for the two points above, i.e. that Husserlian insights into 
cognition itself are needed and that the assumption of thought as being linguistic ought to be 
rejected, we need to understand Husserl’s own theory. This launches us into the field of 
phenomenology.  
2. Phenomenology 
One of the reasons this thesis is needed is that Husserl’s work is largely considered to be 
in another field of philosophy. His phenomenology, the rigorous science he developed of 
investigating cognition and its parts and structure, has largely been insulated from contemporary 
discussion in the various areas of philosophy, outside of those publications and authors who 
specialize in Husserl and Phenomenology. As Dallas Willard, an expert on Husserl, points out 
the significance of Husserl’s Logical Investigations, the central piece in Husserl’s work, is 
entirely disconnected from and neglected by the work of the “trendsetters” in each area of 
philosophy, including epistemology, and the only real concern about it is in the form of 
“someone, surely, ought to know something about Husserl and his writings.”10 This insulation 
                                                     
9 What it means for a proposition to be effable and clear might be relative to the person and subject to 
variation. There may also be a sort of translation problem when offering one’s thoughts to another. All of this is 
consistent with what is meant by ‘clear and effable).  The assumption holds that (regardless of what communication 
problems there maybe) what is going on in the mind of the knower is linguistic in nature. To see this assumption 
explicitly stated in the works of several philosophers and a fuller treatment of it see Dallas Willard, “The Absurdity 
of ‘Thinking in Language’,” The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy IV(1973) 125-132.  
 
5 
has resulted in a general disinterest of Husserl and an attitude which sees his work as irrelevant 
to current issues. Husserl’s work is voluminous and complex. His terminology differs from what 
has become typical in most journals and papers. But his work is dealing with the same 
fundamental questions.   
There has also been a bias in recent epistemology to neglect Husserl because of historical 
reasons. Logical Positivism and its emphasis on language became the dominate force in 
philosophy at the turn of the 20th century. Few would consider themselves logical positivists now 
but much of the underlying approach to philosophy that logical positivism embodied has largely 
been unquestioned. This approach is heavily devoted to language and the process of explanation. 
The process of explanation is the listing of necessary and sufficient conditions for something and 
the postulating of entities to explain some relevant fact (the author thinks that examples of both 
of these in current epistemology are quite readily available, indeed the whole of Gettier problems 
centers on difficulties in listing the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge). These 
historical points are important to the current discussion. They have contributed to the assumption 
that thought is linguistic, that we must adopt an explanative approach, and they require us to 
devote a significant amount of space just to understanding Husserl and his phenomenological 
approach.  
Dallas Willard specialized in Husserl’s early work. Much of his philosophical work 
concerned arguing for the importance of Husserl’s work and advancing a specific understanding 
of Husserl. Willard took a view of Husserl which lies outside the typical views of most 
interpreters. Willard saw Husserl’s work holistically. Most interpreters see Husserl’s later work 
                                                     
10 Dallas Willard, “The Significance of Husserl's Logical Investigations,”(paper presented at The Society 
for the Study of Husserl's Philosophy at the APA meetings in Albuquerque, April 7, 2000), § 1. Available at 
http://www.dwillard.org/articles/artview.asp?artID=60 
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as being a form of idealism which rejected his earlier realist views. On Willard’s side though 
stands Husserl himself, who claimed he never reverted to idealism.11  
Willard provides us with a contemporary voice speaking for Husserl. 
Furthermore, Willard’s overall epistemology has not been researched and discussed and 
his own work has yet to be synthesized in with the current discussion. This paper is also an 
attempt to bring Willard’s work into the discussion. However, it should be noted that Willard 
was a thoroughgoing Husserlian. His view was the view that he took Husserl to have developed. 
Gregg Ten Elshof, a former PhD student of Willard’s, writes: “He (Willard) loved to think, 
write, and talk about a philosopher by the name of Edmund Husserl. He saw in Husserl a few 
crucial insights required to make sense of our ability to have knowledge of the world.”12 Willard 
himself once said “In my view, Husserl had resolved in principle all of the issues about the 
possibility of knowledge in the sense of epistemic realism by the time he finished the Logical 
Investigations.”13 Therefore, much of the development in this paper concerning Husserl’s view 
also serves as an elaboration of Willard’s view. Because of this little distinction is made 
throughout the piece between Husserl’s view and Willard’s. The approach is thus best termed a 
Husserlian-Willardarian approach to knowledge.  
                                                     
11 Edith Stein, who worked for a while as Husserl’s assistant, notes that many of Husserl’s students after 
Ideas was released felt that Husserl had slipped into idealism. Stein notes that Husserl himself tried to “dispel their 
misgivings.” This shows how long running and deep the debate is concerning some of Husserl’s work and that 
Husserl himself is at least on Willard’s side. See Edith Stein, Collected Works of Edith Stein Vol. 1 (Washington 
DC: Washington Province of Discalced Carmelites, 1986), 250 (Found in Greg Jesson “The Husserlian Roots of 
Dallas Willard’s Philosophical and Religious Works,” Philosophia Christi Vol. 16 No1 (2014), 15-16. 
 
12 Gregg Ten Elshof, “On Dallas Willard, Husserl and the Perennial Problem,” EPS blog.  
 
13 Dallas Willard, “The World Well Won: Husserl's Epistemic Realism One Hundred Years Later,” in  
One Hundred Years of Phenomenology, edited by Dan Zahavi and F. Stjernfelt, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Dordrecht, 2002), 69.  
7 
B. Statement of Purpose and Limitations 
The aim of this piece is not to try to enlist the philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Dallas 
Willard in order to settle the great debate currently being waged in epistemology and declare 
either externalism or internalism or any other of the various competing views a winner. Rather, 
the aim is to try and explicate Husserl’s insights and to encourage the continuation of the 
discussion along lines which utilize those insights.  The general aim is to show that a detailed 
analysis and application of a Husserlian-Willardarian (HW) approach to cognition offers a 
potential way forward in the current discussion.  
This progress hinges on Husserl and Willard’s uniform rejection of making language 
central to the discussion and thought itself. If thought is essentially linguistic then one’s 
justificatory reasons must be linguistic. Therefore, access to those reasons must be essentially 
linguistic as well.14 The whole discussion then between whether this access is necessary or not 
for knowledge is undermined if we reject the initial antecedent, the one that held that thought is 
essentially linguistic. Husserl gives us a theory of cognition which is not essentially linguistic. 
His theory of cognition in general and his work concerning the possibility of knowledge in 
particular must both be made clear. The clarification of those two are the focal points of chapters 
two and three. Chapter four shows that, despite the assumption of many, HW is compatible with 
certain aspects of externalism.  
1. Limitations Concerning Current Epistemology 
The current discussion is highly nuanced and voluminous. Any real overview or 
development of current epistemology or even of the externalism-internalism debate far exceeds 
                                                     
14 The whole issue of justification is certainly central to the current discussion and therefore language is 
too. For justification involves thought and all thought (it is assumed) involves language.  
8 
the scope and space of this paper. It should be understood that a tremendous amount of nuancing 
is available concerning internalism, externalism, the terms ‘justification,’ ‘reliable’, etc. What is 
offered here is a very broad approach to these views. But this should be accurate enough for our 
purposes. Our purpose is to show that if one were to reject the assumption which they all share 
(i.e. that thought and hence justification are essentially linguistic), then a new direction to 
approaching these old problems opens up.   
Discussions on Gettier problems, virtue epistemology, and many other areas are again 
outside the scope of this paper. The HW approach developed certainly has implications for these 
issues. But that application should and will be left for subsequent research. Again the thesis is 
that HW provides a new way of looking at these issues, which offers us a more optimistic way of 
addressing them. But the addressing of these current issues is not part of this paper.  
It is recognized in general that there is a recognized stalemate between internalism and 
externalism. The thesis presented here argues that HW is compatible with aspects of each of 
these theories, but the application of HW to these theories or an in-depth analysis of what areas 
of each theory are, or are not, compatible with HW is far too lengthy for this paper. In current 
epistemology there are theories and there are “insights” (i.e. claims, often commonsensical 
which we find hard to deny), about what we should and should not count as knowledge, which 
drive those theories.15 Again, broadly speaking, the insights which drive internalists are the 
classical insights attested to by Plato, (i.e. they revolve around the distinction between 
knowledge and lucky guesses). The externalist insights revolve around beliefs which we are 
rational in holding and for which we do not and need not offer evidence, provided the world is 
                                                     
15 ‘Data’ would be somewhat similar to what I mean here by ‘insights’. However I have used ‘insights’ for 
the following reasons. There is more disagreement concerning these “insights” than what is typical in situations 
where ‘data’ is used. Also these “insights” are often the result of much hard work and lengthy discussion.    
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working properly. This thesis concerns the indicated insights, the motivational factors behind the 
theories, rather than the actual theories which attempt to account for them. In applying the work 
developed here to the current discussion we would move back up to the level of working with 
theories and out of the confines of this paper. In this way this paper concerns what could be 
called meta-epistemology.16 
2. Limitations Concerning Phenomenology 
Husserl’s work is large, complex, and very little of it escapes dispute even among 
Husserlian specialists.17 The view that is being applied to the current discussion though is a 
Husserlian-Willardarian one. Willard was an expert on Husserl and forcefully argued for a 
specific understanding of Husserl. This thesis does not argue that the view presented is Husserl’s 
own, though the author thinks this historical claim is correct. The thesis simply claims that the 
view presented has a strong case going for it in terms of whether it is true or not and that it has 
much potential in regards to the current discussion. By labelling this view ‘Husserlian-
Willardarian’ it allows us to avoid detailed discussions in Husserlian scholarship that would 
exponentially expand and deter from the goal. This provides the basis for the lack of discussion 
concerning Willard’s somewhat unique view of Husserl which disagrees with many other 
Husserlian specialists. It is one thing for us to ask whether Willard’s interpretation of Husserl is 
correct. This is a historical and exegetical question. And it is another question for us to ask if 
Willard’s interpretation of Husserl’s theory is a viable option with application to current 
epistemology. 
                                                     
16 It seems to me that any work which is as concerned with theorizing about cognition as this work is it will 
inevitably fall into this meta category, e.g. much of Kant’s work would be on this meta level.  
 
17 There has been a long history of debate about Husserl’s own view, which goes as far back as one of his 
very own and very early students, Martin Heidegger.  
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Willard and his work, though, stand in a different relation to this paper than do Husserl 
and his work. Because, what is being promoted is not Husserl’s view but Willard’s interpretation 
of it. If there are misunderstandings about what Willard said in regards to Husserl’s theory then 
this would be in opposition to the claims provided here. In other words if one were to disagree 
about what Husserl meant when he said something, that does not concern us. However, if one 
were to disagree about what Willard meant when he said something concerning Husserl then that 
would concern us. So while this is not strictly speaking an exegesis of Husserl, it is an exegesis 
of Willard. While much of the early work in this paper may seem like an exegesis of Husserl, it 
should be remembered that it is an exegesis of a certain understanding of Husserl. Willard, 
throughout his career, forcefully developed and expanded upon this understanding of Husserl. 
Willard developed his own theory by arguing for Husserl’s. An exegesis of Willard then must 
rest heavily on reading Husserl.18 This Willardarian interpretation of Husserl is our concern. 
Many of the references selected from Husserl’s vast corpus are chosen with that in mind. Hence 
our thesis centers on a Husserlian-Willardarian approach to knowledge.  
C. Overview 
1. Chapter Two: Phenomenology 
Chapter 2 begins our discussion of phenomenology. One aspect which is often 
overlooked in Husserlian studies is his early work. This early period of Husserl, roughly 
speaking his work before the Logical Investigations, was the area of Willard’s expertise. His 
view was that Husserl’s later work should be understood in light of his early work. This paper 
                                                     
18 There may be a similar situation when discussing the theories of certain medieval philosophers who, 
while contributing to the field, largely did so by way of commentary on, for example, Plato.  
11 
adopts the same approach, again contributing to the lack of emphasis on Husserl’s later works, 
e.g. Ideas.  
We begin by investigating the problems of mathematical knowledge which Husserl 
himself started with in the early 1890’s. The focus is on Husserl’s insight into the type of 
symbolic thought which characterized mathematics and which he later realized extended to all 
thought in general. Husserl’s emphasis was on the possibility of knowledge. This emphasis 
focuses on questions concerning what sort of operations a subjective mind would have to 
perform in order to reach an objective world and what sort of investigative procedures are 
appropriate for answering such questions.   
Before investigating the specifics of Husserl’s theory of cognition we must understand 
his approach concerning how one must address cognition. This leads us to a discussion of 
Husserl’s science of cognition, phenomenology. Phenomenology in this sense concerns an 
investigative methodology, not a specific theory. In order to understand Husserl’s claims about 
knowledge one must first understand his methodology in addressing those claims.  
The beginning of our discussion concerns Husserl’s claim that the mind does grasp, get 
at, know, reality and that to think otherwise is a contradiction. This does not mean that we have 
knowledge of the whole external world, though. It only means that there is something which the 
mind can grasp. Husserl is a direct realist, but many more steps are needed before it can be 
affirmed that we have knowledge of the external world in any way that would include things like 
balls, chairs, cars, etc. Husserl’s transcendental reduction must first be analyzed in order to find 
out if we can get at the external world. The transcendental reduction focuses us on the acts of 
cognition and their parts and relations. It treats the “truthfulness” or “accuracy” of the images, 
sense data, and various other parts of cognition, with indifference. Rather than using these parts 
12 
to get at the world, the reduction attempts to simply analyze them (i.e. to get clear on what they 
are and what they are doing). The first step laid out for investigation into cognition regards our 
getting clear concerning what is meant by ‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence.’ These terms are 
explained in both their epistemological and ontological contexts. And the second reduction, 
eidetic reduction, is explained as the means by which epistemological immanence is achieved.    
At the heart of epistemological immanence lies the distinction between Aufklarung and 
Erklarung. Aufklarung is understood as a kind of clarification that does not rest on premises or 
use argumentation. It concerns the mind’s removing of ambiguities in regards to what it is 
looking at. Erklarung is viewed as a kind of explanation. It uses argumentation and hence 
necessarily premises as well. The whole investigative process of the physical sciences is a type 
of explanation. Much of philosophy is also an explanatory process. It is argued that in order to 
comprehend the possibility of knowledge, all premises must be excluded and therefore the 
process of clarification, simply seeing what is going on, must be adopted. In closing it is argued 
that the clarification process yields inspectable universals and some objections to this claim are 
discussed.  
2. Chapter Three: Knowledge 
Chapter three applies the phenomenological method developed in chapter two and 
provides us with an explication of knowledge along Husserlian-Willardarian lines. Having 
worked through the reductions in the previous chapter it is now determined what acts of 
cognition and what relations within those acts still remain for investigation. First a discussion 
concerning intentionality is given. In a HW approach the mind is intentionality. That is to say the 
mind does not possess intentionality as a property but the mind simply is active intentionality. 
Therefore, the discussion of intentionality cannot be left aside.  
13 
 We begin by pointing out the major difference between Husserl and both Brentano and 
Frege. The latter two both begin by stipulating some problem, e.g. how can we intend objects 
which do not exist, and then trying to propose the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
solution to the problem. Both of these approaches are also heavily focused on intentional objects. 
Husserl’s starting approach is quite different.  Husserl’s approach to understanding intentionality 
treats intentional objects with indifference, regarding whether they exist or not. It is argued that 
Husserl focuses on trying to gain clarity through the phenomenological method of the acts and 
relations involved in intentionality.   
 The first aspect of intentionality investigated is the noetic. The noetic process concerns 
the structuring of information which is presented to it. A stream of sensory data is not sufficient 
(nor even necessary!) for intentionality.  There must be a structuring process involved which 
operates off of, in our case, hyle, or sensory data. The noetic process turns this raw data into 
something meaningful, it sees the data as being something.19 This structuring process is the 
function of noesis. Noesis, it is explained, is the foundation for having a single unified 
experience which is necessary for intentionality, and hence knowledge.  
 The second aspect dealt with is the noematic component of intentionality. The noematic 
aspect emerges from the prior noetic activity and it specifically concerns the object as it is 
thought to be. This “as the object is thought to be” is itself an object, referred to as Noemata. It is 
argued that Willard helps us to avoid error by rejecting a common assumption in Husserlian 
interpreters, i.e. that if the noema is an object then it is the object of the mental act. The relation 
to noema and the intentional object, the relation between, the hyletic, noetic, and noematic are 
                                                     
19 Cases of visual agnosia are cases where the noetic structuring process is not working properly. See Oliver 
Sacks, The Man Who Mistook his Wife for a Hat and Other Clinical Tales, (New York: Summit Books, 1985).  
14 
explained by example of a white ball under various coloured lights. It is explained that noematic 
intentionality is a supplement to and not a replacement for noetic intentionality.20  
  Next it is explained how the essence of a mental act must contain its intentional 
direction. The intentional direction is simply what an act is about. ‘Direction’ is used as opposed 
to ‘object’ because in Husserl’s view a mental act can be about something that does not exist. If 
‘object’ was used then it would be hard to make sense of how a mental act as a whole is about 
something which does not exist. The essence of any intentional direction is not contained in any 
act. This is seen because many thoughts, mental acts, can be about the same thing. So part of the 
essence of an act, what makes it that particular act, is that it has that particular intentional 
direction. But the essence of any intentional direction, what makes it about X as opposed to Y, is 
not part of any particular act. Husserl’s careful work here is what allows for an act to be what it 
is because of what it is about without transforming what it is about into being a part of the act.  
This serves as the basis for showing that a mental act which can be drawn into 
epistemological immanence has two different parts, ontologically immanent parts and an 
ontologically transcendent part. The ontologically immanent parts are what makes it that act. 
They are part of its essence. The ontologically transcendent part, which is the essence of the 
intentional direction, is a universal. It is a universal since it can be a part of many different acts 
and it is part of the act but not part of the act’s essence. This serves as the bridge between the 
subjective and the objective.  
 With all these points in mind we are then equipped to turn to HW’s approach to what 
knowledge is. After a reminder that the objects of consciousness can be given in one of two 
                                                     
20 Husserl’s work on the noetic and noematic aspects of cognition are his most difficult and debated 
sections. They are the focal points of Husserlian interpreters. Summarizing them is quiet difficult. If the work here is 
not entirely clear the author apologizes and recommends turning to Chapter III: A §2a.  
15 
ways, authentically or symbolically, it is argued that knowledge is the process of seeing a 
symbolic act pass over into an authentic act, this is the process of fulfillment. It is thus a higher 
order act of cognition which relates two other acts in a specific way. 
In closing, a comparison to Kant is given. It is argued that Kant’s work in ethics took a 
similar approach to Husserl’s analysis of cognition. Kant started with an analysis of what is 
necessary for something to be possible before analyzing it in a given situation (for example, 
analyzing the necessary conditions for morality before analyzing its application to humans.). It is 
argued that Kant’s failure in his own work regarding cognition largely concerned his abandoning 
this approach. 
 
3. Chapter Four: Husserl, Willard, and the Current Discussion 
Chapter four concerns the approach to applying HW to the current discussion. Its main 
emphasis is on showing that, contrary to popular opinion, HW is open to certain insights from 
externalism. HW is normally seen as a type of internalism in the classical sense explained above. 
It needs to be remembered that this thesis argues that, because of its very different approach to 
cognition, it is neither a classic internalist view nor is it externalist either. Again the key to all of 
this is the assumption, rejected by HW but accepted by both internalists and externalists, that 
thought is linguistic.  
The beginning of the chapter contrasts the traditional definitional approach to 
epistemology, which is characterized by an attempt to provide the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for knowledge, and a HW approach. The HW approach does not hold that a complete 
list of the noetic conditions for knowledge are possible. This shows that HW takes an approach 
significantly different from most current positions. It is then argued that in rejecting the idea of 
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defining specific normative conditions for knowledge HW has something in common with 
reformed epistemology. The question is then raised as to whether HW is compatible with 
externalist features which are found in reformed epistemology. Reformed epistemology is used 
in this chapter as a type of test case for HW to see if it is compatible with aspects of externalism.  
Since it is widely accepted that Husserl’s theory, and by association Willard’s as well, is an 
internalist theory there is no attempt to show that it is compatible with internalist lines of thought 
in epistemology. However, if HW is meant to provide a new way forward, a hopeful avenue to 
reconciling internalist and externalist notions, then it must be shown that HW is compatible with 
aspects of both sides of the discussion.   
 Again the rejection of a lingocentric model of cognition and adoption of a Husserlian 
model is the solution to reconciling HW with certain externalist features and the key to moving 
forward in the current discussion.  Two interrelated arguments are offered for why this rejection 
is the solution and key. The first explicitly attacks the lingocentric model and attempts to clarify 
HW’s position. This shows that the supposed irreconcilability between HW and externalist 
notions or insights rests on the faulty assumption (i.e. the assumption that thought is linguistic).  
The second argument attempts something more substantial. It first argues against certain 
Heideggerian interpretations of Husserl, i.e. that Husserl’s belief that all cognition is intentional 
commits him to a very strong form of internalism. It is then argued that while cognition is 
essentially intentional both Husserl and Willard have argued for types of subordinate awareness 
with a corresponding subordinate intentionality. In brief the subordinate intentions are ones that 
we are less aware of. These subordinate aspects of cognition allow for the rejection of the strong 
internalism which Heidegger’s interpretation imposes on Husserl. Next an attempt to further 
explicate this subordinate intentionality in light of the current discussion is given. The idea of an 
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intentionality threshold is developed and shown to distinguish between these subordinate and 
primary aspects of intentionality. It is argued that the setting of the threshold is intentional. So 
whether some intentional aspect is one which an agent is highly aware of or one which they are 
not is the result of a previous intention (here one may read choice). This maintains the Husserlian 
claim that cognition is essentially intentional. It is also argued that there is a normative aspect to 
the setting of the threshold, which is to say it can be set rightly or wrongly. It is not argued in 
detail how the threshold ought to be set but rather that one’s view of how it ought to be set will 
make one more or less internalist in their theory.  
 
4. Chapter Five: Closing 
The final chapter summarizes the main points of the paper and attempts to give a very 
precursory view into what lies ahead. It is argued that HW does not settle the current debate or 
cause us to start the discussion all over again. However, it does give us a new starting point and 
approach to the old problems. A standpoint which is more optimistic.   
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II. Phenomenology 
A. Introduction 
 Phenomenology has a history full of disagreement concerning its meaning, use and role. 
This disagreement goes as far back as the misunderstanding between Husserl and his very own 
student Martin Heidegger. In looking specifically at Husserl’s development of phenomenology 
the problem of gaining clarity is increased by his voluminous output and continued disagreement 
concerning his own position. The approach to and application of phenomenology in this paper 
rests heavily on the work of Dallas Willard. Willard was a well-recognized Husserlian expert and 
his own theory of knowledge was purposefully and closely aligned with Husserl’s. Willard not 
only defended and explicated Husserl’s theory but he also applied Husserl’s theory to 
contemporary epistemological issues.21 Willard thus serves as both a guide and a notable 
contributor in his own right. Thus, the area of phenomenology under development here may 
accurately be termed a Husserlian-Willardarian phenomenology of knowledge.  
B. Phenomenology: An Historical Development 
 In many respects (contra to current assumptions which relegates phenomenology off to its 
own separate corner) the field of philosophy is the same as that of phenomenology. In ways that 
will be clarified, the task of Husserl’s phenomenology (specifically his transcendental reduction) 
                                                     
21 Willard’s work was largely outside the main discussions in epistemology. You will be hard pressed to 
find an article or entry by him in a compilation on epistemology. However, his work was often epistemological, 
albeit at the meta level referenced above. Also his work often focused on interpreting Husserl though he regularly 
makes side comments about how Husserl or some point being developed, fits with, challenges, relates to, etc., with 
the current issues. His article Knowledge and Naturalism serves as perhaps one of his best papers for directly 
addressing the current discussion. It should be noted that work though is largely apologetical in nature.    
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was to exclude particulars and practical concerns and to focus on “the whole of things.”22 
Aristotle differentiates first philosophy, or metaphysics, from the study of individual beings to 
that of the study of being as being. Likewise, Husserl attempted to explicate the intellectual 
process that goes on in nous (to use a classical term) as opposed to what goes on in individual 
minds. Robert Sokolowski notes the connection between Aristotle and Husserl as both being 
theoria tes aletheias (theory of truth) and calls Aristotle’s a ta meta ta physika (beyond the 
physical) and Husserl’s a ta meta ta psychika (beyond the psychical).23 Aristotle focuses his 
philosophy on substance, contrasting his philosophy against the lesser field of physics and the 
study of particular substances. Husserl focuses his philosophy on mind, specifically its relation to 
truth.  
In understanding Husserl it is best to follow the example of Willard and seek to first 
understand Husserl’s early work (beginning with his early work in mathematics). Willard notes 
that what originally piqued the interest of Husserl was his endeavor to explain the reasoning 
processes of mathematics. Husserl sought the means by which the mind of the mathematician 
was directed to truths concerning numbers and number relations.24 Husserl recognized that 
mathematics (the long standing paradigm of objective knowledge) had a rigorous and lawful 
order to it which allowed the mathematician to have a clear understanding and nearly indubitable 
knowledge of mathematical truths.25 What Husserl came to realize though is that the 
                                                     
22 Robert Sokolowski, “Husserl on First Philosophy,” (paper presented at Husserl Memorial Lecture 2009),  
1. Available at http://philosophy.cua.edu/res/docs/faculty/rss/HUSSERL%20ON%20FIRST%20PHILOSOPHY.pdf  
 
23 Ibid., 2-3. 
 
24 Dallas Willard, "Wholes, Parts and the Objectivity of Knowledge," Parts and Moments: Studies in Logic 
and Formal Ontology, Philosophia Verlag GmbH. München (1982), 382. 
 
25 Ibid., 382. 
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mathematician arrived at this knowledge by means of “a mere rule-governed manipulation of 
sense perceptible symbols.”26 What is important here is that what is being used and what the 
mind is focusing on in the process of even simple mathematical operations (like addition or 
multiplication) are not numbers themselves, specific numerical concepts, but symbols. 
“(Calculating) is not an activity with concepts, but rather with signs.”27 Numbers and number 
relations are the foci of study early on for Husserl but ‘concept’ can include any substance, 
essence, relation, property, etc., that thought can be directed toward. 
Now concepts can come before our minds in one of two ways: Authentically, where the 
concept itself is present to the mind, or inauthentically, where the concept is represented by 
something else which is authentically given, i.e. a symbol.28 It might be held that simple 
numbers, say 0-9 or so (even simple relations between numbers, e.g. that 2 is twice that of 1) 
may be intuited and perhaps even authentically given. However, as the numbers get larger and 
the relations more and more complex (e.g. the number 926,536 or the relation between it and 
1,389,804) this becomes impossible. The mathematician then in order to find a specific concept 
focuses entirely on things which lie outside of the concepts themselves, symbols. So to find the 
number one and half that of 926,536 one does not focus on the concept behind the symbol 
‘926,536’ and on the concept “one-and-a-half.” Rather, one focuses on a set of symbols arranged 
in a pattern, both of which are determined by historical and cultural influences, manipulates 
                                                     
26 Ibid., 382. 
 
27 Edmund Husserl, The Philosophy of Arithmetic: Psychological and Logical Investigations trans. Dallas 
Willard, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2003), 254. 
 
28Dallas Willard, “Knowledge,” in The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, edited by Barry Smith and 
David Woodruff Smith, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995),140.  
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those symbols according to set rules, then writes a new symbol, ‘1,389,804’, and is then directed 
by that symbol to the proper concept.  
Husserl, having established this “epistemic progression” then sought the answer to the 
question: What are the mental processes and their order and relations which allows for this 
symbolic thinking, thinking focused entirely on things other than numbers and their relations, 
“that nevertheless allows those processes to eventuate in a grasp of truths about numbers and 
number relations”?29  Husserl then realized that this problem of symbolic thinking was not 
limited to mathematics alone. In the long running philosophical tradition it is not the things 
themselves (objects, i.e. the ding en sich or die Sachen selbst in Husserl’s terms) which enter into 
our subjective minds and with which we are acquainted. Rather, we interact with images, or 
mental symbols, of those things. Aristotle himself pointed out “It is not the stone which enters 
the soul.”30 Willard describes this shift in thinking which provided the starting point and the goal 
for Husserl’s latter work:  
(Husserl) therefore found himself involved in a more general 
epistemological inquiry concerning how ordinary as well as scientific thinking — 
both of which largely deal in highly partial or extrinsic determinations, or even 
mere symbols, of the subject matters at issue, instead of with the matters 
themselves — nevertheless can result in an accurate grasp of truths about die 
Sachen selbst, and in many cases even a grasp of those very things themselves? 
What are the laws of cognitive experience that account for this? It is in this form 
that the problem of the objectivity of cognitive experience in general first 
addressed itself to Husserl.31  
                                                     
29 Dallas Willard, “Wholes, Parts and the Objectivity of Knowledge,” 382-383.  
 
30 Aristotle, De Anima, III 8. The translation I used here is Anton Pegis’ and can found in Anton Pegis, “St. 
Thomas Aquinas and Husserl On Intentionality,” in Thomistic Papers 1, (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 
1984) 114. 
 
31 Dallas Willard, “Wholes, Parts and the Objectivity of Knowledge,” 383. 
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This emphasis on the subject-object gap represents a further development in Husserl’s 
thought. The symbolic problem that has been under discussion can be seen as a subset of the 
subject-object problem. The problem that Husserl now focuses on is how can any form of 
thought or cognition, symbolic or otherwise, reach something objective.32  Husserl maintained 
that we do in fact know things and that this knowing relation between the subject and the thing 
known is something objective. That is to say that “there is an objective difference between one 
who has knowledge of something and one who does not.”33 This follows the paradigm set up in 
considering mathematical knowledge. It is commonly conceded that the answers to mathematical 
questions are right or wrong, that there is an objectivity about them. However, the use and 
manipulation of symbols is subjective, for they are part of our mental experiences. And mental 
experiences are unique and non-repeatable, even within the mental life of the selfsame person.34 
Furthermore, there seems to be no reason to hold that mental experiences (of any sort) have any 
existential import. Mental experiences seem to remain shut off from the objective realm (hence 
skeptical and epistemological questions in the first place). 
 This subjective element is perhaps harder to see in mathematical inquiry as opposed to 
other inquiries, e.g. about colour. The two inquiries, of colour and number are quite similar 
though (apart from the fact that the objectivity of the former is much more disputed than the 
latter). There just is no guarantee that what you see as being the colour red matches with my 
image of red or that what you see as being the number two or an addition sign matches with my 
experience of them. In the case of numbers this difficulty is disregarded due to the fact that we 
                                                     
32 Dallas Willard, “Knowledge” 150.  
 
33 Dallas Willard, “Knowledge and Naturalism,” in Naturalism: A Critical Analysis, edited by William 
Lane Craig (New York: Routledge, 2000), 24. 
 
34 Willard, “Wholes, Parts, and the Objectivity of Knowledge,” 380. 
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commonly accept ‘2’ or ‘II” as being symbols. But this disregarded difficulty is of great 
importance and it returns us to the problem which faced Husserl: How does the use and 
manipulation of symbols lead to a grasp of the objective non-symbolic things themselves? Any 
system which allows for the possibility of knowledge and the thesis that our mental experiences 
are unique and lacking in existential import is faced with the same problem which Husserl 
investigated. This is a problem concerning all matters which fall under the purview of thought, 
mathematical, colourful, or otherwise.  
This brings us to Husserl’s way of answering this problem. However, before going on to 
look at Husserl’s solution we should note that this problem concerns the possibility of 
knowledge. It does not address the issue of defining knowledge.  
Current epistemology focuses largely on the definition of knowledge (namely the listing 
of necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge). Quine and natural epistemology would 
have us hold that issues of normativity are not necessary for knowledge and they then attempt to 
provide sufficient conditions for knowledge without reference to normativity and within a natural 
framework.35 Gettier troublesomely points out to us that justification, truth, and belief are (as a 
set) insufficient for knowledge. Virtue theorists attempt to show the sufficiency of being 
responsibly or reliably functioning agents in order to have knowledge.36 Plantinga insists that 
evidence, of the classical evidentialist variety, is not necessary for knowledge.37 All of these 
                                                     
35 W. V. Quine “Epistemology Naturalized,” in Knowledge ed. Sven Bernecker and Fred Dretske (Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 274. 
 
36 Phillip Olson, “Putting Knowledge in its Place: Virtue, Value, and The Internalism/Externalism Debate,” 
Philosophical Studies 159, no. 2 (2012), 246. 
 
37 Alvin Plantinga, “The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology,” in Arguing About Religion edited by 
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theories assume that knowledge is in fact possible. They focus on either providing a definition of 
it (the listing of the sufficient conditions for it, thus taking on a positive role) or they focus 
primarily on refuting the definitions of other theories (taking on a negative role. Of course a 
mixture of these positive and negative roles is quite common as well.   
Husserl’s work, thus far, makes no attempt to affirm or deny any definition (in the sense 
dealt with above) of knowledge. Husserl is addressing the sole question concerning the analysis 
of the possibility of knowledge. Husserl distinguished then the definitional aspect of a theory of 
knowledge from the aspect concerning its possibility by differentiating between Erklarung and 
Aufklarung.38 Erklarung concerns explanation and explanation itself regards taking knowledge 
as a natural fact and then subjecting it to various tests to further understand or define it. As there 
are physical tests for scientists and their theories so there are thought experiments for 
philosophers and their theories. In this way epistemology which follows the process of Erklarung 
borrows from the natural sciences.39 Aufklarung though concerns clarification which does not 
rest on any form of argumentation. One must simply “see what is there to be seen.”40 
Husserl is advocating for an entirely different way of attempting to answer the question 
concerning the possibility of knowledge. While much more will be said about the difference 
between Aufklarung and Erklarung and the primacy of the former, Husserl’s clarifying approach 
to the question concerning the possibility of knowledge rejects the idea of grounding this 
                                                     
38 Edmund Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, translated by Lee Hardy (Hingham, MA : Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1999), 63. The author read two different Translations of Die Idee der Phanomenologie  the 
reference will be to the translation which seemed most fitting and will be indicated in abbreviated notes by “Hardy” 
or “AN” for The Alston and Nakhnikian  translation. 
 
39 Ibid., 63.  
 
40 This is a very brief description of Aufklarung. The author apologizes for any confusion which results 
from this brevity. A more detailed analysis is coming shortly. This location unfortunately did not seem suited to a 
more detailed analysis (the author feared it would detract from the main flow of the argument). Ibid., 35. 
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possibility in an argument. Arguments move from premises to a conclusion. But when dealing 
with the possibility of knowledge all premises must be set aside at the outset. The process of 
clarification does not rest on argumentation or experimentation (in any way close to the usual 
sense of those terms). It concerns very careful and focused attention on what is happening. A 
good example here may be what happens when thinking about the law of non-contradiction and 
why it must be true. The law does not rest on any argument. That would be circular. But careful 
thought which brings the law into clarity reveals why it must be true.  
 Given though that there is a subjective and an objective component to knowledge the 
question arises: How does the subjective mind reach out and grasp the objective?41 The question 
concerning the subject-object gap is the foundational epistemological question. As Willard points 
out the answer to how this is possible turns into, at minimum, a necessary condition for the 
possibility of knowledge.42 What Husserl offers us is a description of “the relationship between 
the subjectivity of the knower and the objectivity of the content of knowledge.”43 
1. Foundations for Locating Knowledge in a Husserlian System 
 Before delving into the epistemological work of Husserl it is necessary to lay out the 
foundations of his philosophical methodology (his phenomenological system as a whole). 
Husserl’s phenomenological methodology is deeply intertwined with his epistemology. 
                                                     
41 This represents a development in the thought and work of Husserl from his work which focused 
specifically on the symbolic vs authentic. For symbolic thought is but one way of describing the subject-object gap. 
As Willard Points out “Husserl’s question about the nature and possibility of knowledge is no longer stated in terms 
of what is present and how it enables us to grasp what is not present – though that always remains an issue to be 
dealt with. Rather, as of 1900 at least, it is in terms of “the relationship between the subjectivity of the knowing and 
the objectivity of the content known.” ” Dallas Willard, “Knowledge,” 150.  
 
42 Willard, “Wholes, Parts, and the Objectivity of Knowledge,” 381. 
 
43 Willard’s translation of Husserl Ibid., 381and Dallas Willard “Knowledge,” 150. 
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However, its meticulously detailed development over tens of thousands of pages makes his 
phenomenology far too broad and deep to cover here at any real depth. What will be given here 
is a brief overview and introduction to the phenomenological method with the aim of equipping 
us to understand Husserl’s epistemology.  
 The question which guides Husserl’s theory is “What is it about the nature of the mental 
act which allows it to be ‘about’ something which may or may not exist?”44 This is a question 
concerning the possibility of philosophical thought. Hence in addition to Sokolowski’s 
description of Husserl’s thought as a ta meta ta psychika (beyond (in the foundational sense) the 
psychical) we might further clarify it as being ta meta ta Sophia (beyond wisdom or 
Philosophy).45 Characteristic of all philosophy, including skeptical philosophy, is that it attempts 
to explain reality, it is directed at truth. In Husserl’s own words:  
Philosophical thinking is circumscribed by one’s position towards the 
problems concerning the possibility of cognition. The perplexities in which 
reflection about the possibility of cognition that “gets at” the things themselves 
becomes entangled: How can we be sure that cognition accords with things as 
they exist in themselves, that it (cognition) “gets at them”?46 
Skeptical philosophy then offers the greatest restraint to philosophical thinking, 
circumscribing it to dealing with only the mind’s inability to grasp reality outside of it. However, 
this inability is intended to be a statement or description of reality and as such it is philosophical 
(having no regard for the practical import, or lack thereof, of such a theory). In such a system our 
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45 Sokolowski supports this when he notes that Husserl’s philosophy is only concerned with the mind and 
its operations which enter into truth Robert Sokolowski, “Husserl on First Philosophy,” 4. Also note that this 
‘beyond’ is meant in the foundational sense as well. Meta-ethics is still ethics. Meta-philosophy is still philosophy (it 
is just philosophy in its most foundational form).  
 
46 Edmund Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, translated by Willaim Alston and George Nakhnikian 
(The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 1. 
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minds do get at reality but the only bit of reality that they “get at” is quite small and rather 
pessimistic. In even this restricted philosophy we see that there is a particular type of thinking 
which “gets at” reality. The claim that “I can know whether there is a mind independent reality” 
and the claim “I cannot know whether there is a mind independent reality” are both claims about 
the reality of the knowing situation. So too is the claim “I do not know if I can or cannot know 
whether there is a mind independent reality.”47 As such they share a particular form; a form 
which they share with other claims such as “I know this is a pencil”, “God exists”, and “Science 
is the only path to knowledge.” The assertions that “there are no such claims” or that “all such 
claims are false” are self-defeating. Gregg Jesson remarks that: 
 The rejection of truth and knowledge simply presupposes some truth and knowledge. If 
one is not claiming that his or her view is true, or if one is claiming not to know the view he or 
she is defending, then the whole position collapses into self-contradiction. To say, “Today is 
Tuesday but I’m not saying that this is true” or to say, “401 is a prime number, but I am not 
saying that this is true,” is as confused and muddled as any view can possibly be.48  
It seems to be unquestionable that there is a form of thought which is directed at grasping 
reality. However limited these claims may be: “Cognition (read ‘Knowledge’) in general is 
beyond question for to assert otherwise is a contradiction. The question of epistemology is not 
“is there cognition?” but “Can cognition reach its objects?” ”49  
Willard called the skeptical position (which attempts to deny that knowledge of objective 
reality is possible) “Midas touch epistemology” (meaning whatever bit of objective reality the 
mind tries to grasp hold of it immediately transforms into the subjective).50 He further points out 
                                                     
47 Feel free to continue reducing this question as much as you like.  
 
48 Greg Jesson, “The Husserlian Roots of Dallas Willard’s Philosophical and Religious Works,” 11. 
  
49 Edmund Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, (AN) 23. Note that here again the foundation of 
epistemology is built on the analysis of the possibility of knowledge.  
 
50 Dallas Willard, “The Significance of Husserl's Logical Investigations,”§3.  
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how even this skeptical position is giving us an objective essence of cognition. Hence there 
appears once again the overlap between world and mind.51 
What Husserl undertook was an investigation into this peculiar form of thought, the form 
of thought which is directed at “grasping” reality. An investigation which excludes all particular 
claims of truths and looks at the nature or form of that particular aspect of cognition which “gets 
at” reality; “when investigating cognition we look not at the particulars of some mental event but 
at the universals, which are about cognition in general.”52  
2. The Transcendental Reduction 
In order to focus on the essential or universal form of anything (or simply to find out if 
there is an essence or universal form of something) there are several things which much be 
excluded according to Husserl. The first is all transcendences. This exclusion is brought about by 
the epoche,53 or transcendental reduction.54 Husserl pointed out that during our everyday lives 
we have a tendency to focus on the corporeal world (that is, on empirical data, and not on 
essences, universals, or ideals). The former set quite naturally and easily lends itself to us and 
our perception of it occurs with no deliberate effort on our own part.55 However, it is not in this 
readily accessible natural world that essences are to be found if they are to be found at all. And 
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53 George Nakhnikian, Introduction to The Idea of Phenomenology, translated by Willaim Alston and 
George Nakhnikian (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), XVII. 
 
54 Jaakko Hintikka, “The Phenomenological Dimension,” in The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, edited 
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the ease with which we attend to the corporeal and the empirical then becomes a hindrance to our 
attempts to not attend to it “The spell of naturalism… makes it so difficult for all of us to see 
“essences” or “ideas”.”56  
This transcendental reduction is not to be confused with the Cartesian method of doubt. 
The existence of the transcendences is not to be doubted or indeed dealt with at all. Husserl says 
it is assigned “the index of indifference.”57 As David Cooper helpfully points out the role of the 
transcendental reduction serves in a similar way to the role of quotation marks.58 When in a class 
studying Kant, Kant is quoted and his words put into quotation marks. The point of this is 
usually not to focus on the words in such a way as to be directed towards an analysis of their 
truth value. But instead to focus on the words in such a way as to be directed towards an 
understanding of what is meant by the quote. “A likely purpose of putting… words inside 
quotation marks is to concentrate attention on what is meant (Cooper’s emphasis) by them and 
away from the question of their truth.”59 Attention (for the transcendental reduction) is to be 
focused on the hyle (the raw sensory material presented to our minds) but, contra the natural 
mindset, we are not to then be lead away to transcendences and inquiry concerning their nature 
and possible or actual existence. Instead, one is to focus on the hyle in such a way as to be 
directed towards an analysis of the structuring process of this raw material along with all the 
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objects and relations found therein.  This structuring process is called noesis, which is the 
unifying act which makes any type of perception possible.60 “Thus there is little more to his 
transcendental εποχη and examination of essences than a determination to examine the meaning 
of common concepts and ordinary beliefs rather than to add factual detail to our knowledge.”61 
And of course one of the results of this transcendental reduction is that what we are left with is 
entirely immanent to us. 
However, a mere excluding of transcendences does not constitute a sufficient condition 
for the examination of essences though it is a necessary condition. Our mere attending to the 
structuring process of cognition or mental acts as a whole does not yield inspectable universals. 
To best understand Husserl’s way of getting from the inspection of non-transcendental hyle, 
noesis, and all the other components and relations which make up a mental act, to essences we 
must understand the eidetic reduction. The eidetic reduction ultimately concerns not removing 
bits of data but in forming a different way of looking at those bits of data present in 
consciousness. We must also understand Husserl’s two conceptions of transcendence and his two 
conceptions of immanence.  
  3. The Beginner’s Immanence and Transcendence 
One of the results of our aforementioned instance on an overlap between our 
consciousness and reality is that reality in some way (no matter how small of a way it is) 
interfaces with our consciousness and is immediately given to us.62 The first type of immanence 
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involves nothing that points outside of itself and is fully self-given without evidence. Husserl 
calls this reell or genuine immanence.63  Here one may think of the example of being appeared to 
treely as the indubitable aspect of seeing a tree. This is what Husserl calls the beginners view of 
immanence and transcendence.64 The immanent being that which is in me, such as my being 
appeared to treely, and the transcendent being that which is outside of me, such as the tree itself, 
which seeing a tree necessarily implies.65 Willard calls this ontological immanence and 
transcendence. “Something is, of course, immanent to the act (read ‘mental act’ or ‘cognition in 
the broadest sense’ as clarified below) or to the mind if it is genuinely (reell) contained in it as a 
constituent, and correspondingly transcendent if it is not.”66 As noted above the transcendental 
reduction excludes all transcendences because it is questionable and because our aim is the 
explanation of how knowledge can reach its transcendent object and so all transcendent 
knowledge or purported claims to knowledge are categorically ruled out.67   
The parts of cognitions which are reellen immanent are particulars (that is they are 
isolated and non-repeatable). But they stand in relation to one another. As Husserl says “They 
(particular or isolated cognitions) enter into logical relations with each other, they follow from 
one another, they “cohere” with one another, they support one another…”68 Willard points out 
that seeing properties of and parts of a table, nonetheless something like the underside of this 
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table, cannot occur without a very complex flow of mental cognitions and relations between 
them.69 To be appeared to, for example, undersided-tablely is not possible in just any flow of 
cognition. Consider being abducted, blindfolded and placed in a room under a table. Upon 
having the blindfold removed and opening your eyes you will not be appeared to undersided-
tablely. It will take a stream of several cognitions at least, e.g. being appeared to table-legly, 
floorly, etc., and will require a significant background of cognitions. Similarly being appeared to 
at all or any other form of mental act falls under what Husserl calls “cognition in the broadest 
sense.”70  
4. The Eidetic Reduction and Epistemological Immanence and Transcendence 
Now it must be noted that these isolated cognitions are objective or transcendent in this 
first sense in a special way. Swinburne notes that in order to tell a complete story of the universe 
it would not only involve things like the battle of waterloo but also Napoleon’s thoughts during 
the battle of waterloo.71 They thus have an objective element about them. Any person’s particular 
cognition at any moment has “sensory content (which) stands there as content that is given, 
sensed, and recognized by this person, and integrates itself within the perception of objective 
time… it appears as a datum in objective time… thus it is a phenomenon in keeping with the 
sense of the positive science we call psychology.”72 This fact (of the transcendent aspect of 
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cognitions) requires us to perform an additional reduction which further excludes such 
transcendences.  
This reduction Husserl calls the phenomenological reduction or eidetic reduction or 
abstraction.73  It is a way of looking at things. As in the former reduction the emphasis here is not 
on excluding bits of data but excluding ways of looking at that data. The natural tendency, it was 
noted, was to merely use the ontologically immanent cognitions in order to add to our factual 
knowledge or merely in order to function appropriately. There is then a similarly “psychological” 
tendency to look at these given cognitions in such a way as to attend to the objective 
transcendent facts of our inner “psychic” or “mental” experiences.74 In so attending we miss the 
key to the witness of essences. It was an analysis of these objective mental components that Kant 
based his critique of pure reason off of (where he worked at establishing objective laws and 
regulations which govern subjective consciousness).75 And for not excluding these objective 
mental cognitions in the appropriate way Husserl criticized Kant and claimed superiority over 
Kant’s critique of knowledge.76 What Kant needed, on a Husserlian account, was the eidetic 
reduction.  In bracketing out these psychological, or egological, transcendences we are left with a 
pure perception of consciousness (e.g. perception of all that is going on and contained in the act 
of being appeared to tablely).  
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This “pure” perception corresponds to the second type of immanence and transcendence. 
This second form of transcendence Willard refers to as “epistemological transcendence.”77 Lee 
Hardy refers to this latter concept of immanence and transcendence as “Phenomenological 
transcendence and immanence.”78 The “pure” perception is a perception which is directed at a 
purely ontologically immanent perception. As Husserl says it is “a reflective and purely 
immanent perception which has undergone the reduction.”79 The purely immanent perception 
refers to nothing transcendent and so it makes no sense to doubt it: “to have an appearance 
before one’s eye, which refers to something that is not itself given in the phenomenon, and to 
doubt whether it exists or how its existence is to be understood- that makes sense. But to see and 
intend nothing other than what is grasped in the seeing, and yet still question and doubt-that 
makes no sense at all.”80  Since this reduction places these cognitions before us in such a way 
that we see them clearly they thus become immanent in the second sense.  
These individual cognitions are not necessarily immanent in this latter sense though, 
hence the requirement of the second reduction along with the attention to perception that 
necessarily accompanies it. Consider the case where one is driving home and being appeared to 
treely repeatedly yet the individual pays no attention to them. These appearances (when 
investigated as mere appearances of trees) are purely immanent in the first sense. But, as many 
mature and skilled drivers can confirm from their own experiences, they remain very 
transcendent in the latter sense. We pay no attention to them at all such that we would have to 
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“replay” our appearances in order to answer the question “Were you appeared to treely during 
your drive?” A further example is when something suddenly “clicks” with a person. Consider 
when someone finally understands the difference between validity and soundness. What their 
mind is doing is purely immanent in the first sense (the ontological sense). However, these 
mental operations are often opaque to them (i.e. transcendent in the latter sense, 
epistemologically). Imagine asking someone who finally grasped this distinction “What did you 
do just now to make sense of it?” Think about the confused look and muddled response you 
would get in turn.   
The trouble, says Husserl, is that on the beginner’s view of immanence and 
transcendence the two different forms of immanence and transcendence are conflated. It is 
implicitly assumed both that what is ontologically immanent is epistemologically immanent (but 
as argued above this is not so, and it certainly is not necessarily so) and that what is ontologically 
transcendent is epistemologically transcendent. Willard succinctly puts the point this way: 
“Something immanent in the latter sense (epistemological immanence) may be transcendent in 
the first sense (ontologically)… and something transcendent in the second sense 
(epistemologically) might be immanent in the first sense, as with a thought or valuation not fully 
focused on in intuition.”81 It is this epistemological immanence that is the goal of both 
reductions.82 And Husserl uses the terms ‘evidenz’ and ‘anschauung’ (or what Husserl says is the 
correct use and conception of the a priori) to denote this concept.83  In English translations this 
concept appears as ‘evidence’ or ‘intuition’ (these being the common translations of the 
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aforementioned German terms but ‘the immediately given’ or ‘ “seeing” ’ often appear as 
well).84  
This distinction between the two types of immanence and transcendence immediately 
opens the door for the possibility of something being ontologically transcendent but 
epistemologically immanent. Hence, for the possibility of the subjective mind to reach objective 
reality. What remains for Husserl is to find out what it is exactly that survives this final reduction 
(and as such is thus able to be “seen”) and then to determine whether the overlap of mind and 
reality into a state of intuition can be drawn into this sphere.85 As Willard notes this determining 
of how it could be possible to draw in this overlap must be prior to the answering of the question 
as to whether it is possible or not.86 
5. Aufklarung and Erklarung 
Before further explication of Husserl’s view it is important to reemphasis the difference 
in function of and nature of auflkarung, or clarification, as opposed to erklarung, or explanation. 
Doing so will help us understand what it is that survives the reductions and what type of analysis 
we should expect to be given. Husserl helpfully explains the difference between these two, and 
provides a nice illustration as well, in his introduction to The Idea of Phenomenology. In the 
section where he is discussing his search for the possibility of knowledge he says,  
What I want is clarity (emphasis in the original). I want to understand the 
possibility of this contact, that is, if we consider what we mean here: I want to 
bring within my purview the essence of the possibility of this contact, to bring it 
to givenness in an act of seeing. A “seeing” cannot be demonstrated. A blind 
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person who would like to be able to see cannot acquire that ability through 
scientific demonstrations; physical and physiological theories of color yield no 
intuitive clarity about the sense of color comparable to the clarity possessed by 
those who can see.87  
 Here Husserl is describing how to obtain clarity (Klarheit) in the understanding of the 
contact between the subjective and the transcendent. What Husserl is opposed to is any process 
of “deducing, inducing, calculating, and the like” which reasons from things given, or 
established, to something not yet given while in the process of understanding the possibility of  
knowledge.88 Such an instance is easily understood when one considers that the answer to the 
possibility of knowledge would be viciously circular if any such attempt was made.  Deduction 
and induction both depend on something already being given and proceeding from there (either 
with certainty or probability respectively); even the simplest argument must have a premise. All 
positive sciences proceed by such methods and therefore cannot be used in answering the 
question of the possibility of knowledge. Such sciences would only constitute what Husserl 
called “a mistaken μεταβασι.”89 Husserl ties the process of erklarung with the positive sciences 
and insists that to avoid the vicious circularity and find a true μεταβασις our only option is to 
seek and use aufklarung instead. To best understand the basis for this claim it is helpful to go 
back to the domain of mathematics.  
 Richard Tieszen discusses the problem different theories of mathematics have in trying to 
do justice to the objectivity of mathematics and provide a metamathematical theory which 
provides a basis for the practicality and usefulness of mathematics as well as the seemingly 
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objective and intuitive pull of mathematics.90 He notes that Hilbertian projects, which constitute 
an explanative approach through the use of theorems, is plagued by Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorem.91 As in the case of mathematics (or in the case of the law of non-contradiction as 
discussed earlier) or (and this is the center for our discussion) the possibility of knowledge, our 
ability to explain or argue for certain key bits of data cannot be covered by argumentation, 
explanation, or any other type of maxim.  
Other pragmatic or Quinean approaches suffer from a non-intuitiveness and subject 
mathematics to the natural sciences.92 While in mathematics the distillation of math to the natural 
sciences may be undesirable and counterintuitive it does not fall prey to the Husserlian criticism 
of a mistaken μεταβασι in the same way that such an attempt would when applied to the 
possibility of knowledge (in the latter case it is truly impossible to do so. The only way even a 
pseudo attempt to do this can be made is by shifting, albeit subtly, the question).93 Regardless, 
what is of importance here is the need for a foundation for math that extends beyond the merely 
practical. Gödel’s incompleteness theorem was developed with Husserl’s philosophy in mind and 
directed at all attempts to fully “explain” mathematics.94  Both Husserl’s and Gödel’s approach is 
that below all explanation there must be an intuitive “seeing” which relies on nothing outside of 
itself and neither needs nor can have a full explanation. The clarity of “sight” is itself the only 
proper and possible foundation for such knowledge (indeed for knowledge in general and the 
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possibility therein). After painstaking development of the phenomenological reduction Husserl 
says, “This discussion is, of course, only a roundabout way of helping us to see what is to be 
seen here.”95  
Husserl’s processes is not what has become the common method of analytic philosophy. 
The analytic method is that of the postulating of entities, relations, causes, and the like, and then 
attempting to show how they explain the relevant data (how the data can be “deduced, induced, 
calculated, and the like” from them). Willard also supports this understanding of Husserl and his 
position when discussing intentionality. He shows the infinite regress and circularity of 
appealing to “meanings” (which amount to the postulation of an entity to explain intentionality) 
and shows Husserl’s marked distinction from this approach: “The goal for Husserl is, instead, to 
describe intentionality in terms of its essential characteristics and differentiations, and in relation 
to the internal complexities of the acts upon which, in its various forms, it is founded or 
essentially depends-the descriptions to be guided by intuition of those characteristics, 
differentiations and inner founding structures themselves.”96 Tieszen also rightly says in regards 
to Husserl’s theory of mathematics that “Husserl is advocating a descriptive method for 
clarification of the meaning of mathematical concepts.”97   
Whatever the status of such a clarifying approach is it remains clear that in several cases 
(e.g. the possibility of knowledge, mathematics, and intentionality) this approach avoids the 
problems of infinite regress and vicious circularity. It is thus at least able to provide an account 
(albeit a descriptive one) where explanative processes are lacking. Again specifically in the case 
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of the possibility of knowledge this approach seems to be the only possible option due to the 
nature of explanation.   
Now, one might object that such an account (i.e. one that offers clarification) is subpar to 
an explanatory account. I think Husserl would rightly argue that since all explanatory approaches 
rely on or assume an account which is based on clarification (per the above arguments 
concerning Gödel and Midas touch epistemology) such preference is a mere bias for the 
“scientific” or natural mindset. This is further established by the points made above concerning 
skepticism and “Midas touch epistemology.” Something must be given to us without mediation. 
And the answers to “What is given to us?” and “How much is given to us without mediation?” 
requires clarification of the unmediated process. Furthermore (whether this process is less 
desirable or not) it would remain for the detractor to provide an additional account of the 
possibility of knowledge or of some defeater to the account given above. An alleged superiority 
of eklarung over aufklarung amounts to neither.  
6. Essences and Universals 
So in returning to our development of the question “what is it that remains after the 
reductions?” Husserl’s answer is (as was noted at the beginning of our discussion) essences or 
universals. Husserl says that eidetic abstraction “yields inspectable universals, species, essences, 
and so it seems to provide the redeeming idea (the redeeming idea concerning how to connect the 
subjective with the objective).” 98 What lies before us after the reductions is the essence of 
cognition in Husserl’s broad sense. And so any act of cognition, any mental act, can be laid 
before us in a pure “seeing.” We can “see” perception and other various mental acts, including 
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knowledge itself. The phenomenological reduction has laid bare to us not things like an 
individual perception but perception itself (perception as a universal or the essence of 
perception). Husserl says, “Surely I can get clear on the essence of knowledge when I see it for 
myself, and when it is itself given to me, just as it is, in “seeing.”  I must study knowledge 
immanently, through a pure seeing, within the pure phenomenon, within “pure consciousness”: 
its transcendence is, of course, dubitable; the existence of the objectivity, to which it refers, is not 
given to me insofar as it is transcendent.”99 We should now have, then, a clear understanding of 
the phenomenological method for obtaining an understanding of how Knowledge is possible. 
7. A Defense of “Seeing” 
Before moving on to the final stages of development of Husserl and his theory of 
knowledge it is appropriate that some objections to Husserl’s theory of “seeing” should first be 
dealt with. So what of detractors who claim that such pure acts of “seeing” are impossible, 
unlikely, or even that they themselves are not able to obtain such “seeing” and so cast doubt and 
suspicion of the legitimacy of the process? The first line of response regards all arguments 
against “seeing” which argue against “seeing” because of some other “fact” which serves as a 
defeater for Husserl’s theory.100 This approach to objecting to this aspect of Husserl’s theory, 
though, rests on a false μεταβασι. Since Husserl is here dealing with the problem of the 
possibility of knowledge to rely on some datum or any number of data, of “evidence,” “fact,” or 
the like to defeat “seeing,” or any other component of his theory at this level of the discussion, is 
to attempt to use what has already been thrown aside at the outset of the discussion (and thrown 
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aside necessarily due to the nature of the discussion). It would only be fitting to either show 
where Husserl himself has broken this rule or provide an alternate account of how knowledge is 
possible.  
The second line of defense concerns arguments which appeal to experience. These 
arguments claim that either they themselves do not experience “seeing” or that what is there to 
be seen are not universals or essences. In response to the first form of argumentation it is helpful 
to return to the discussion of symbolic thinking that led Husserl and us down this path of 
discussion.  
 As Willard notes, strongly rooted in common sense is that things appear before us (i.e. 
that we have minds and things appear to us in our minds).101 Those objects can be represented to 
us in our minds in one of two ways, authentically, where the object itself is fully present (if this 
were to occur then I could have certainty concerning the object for it would be epistemologically 
immanent) or symbolically (i.e. inauthentically, the object itself is not fully present in the 
manifold of experience but mediated. This mediation process may, of course, be accurate or 
inaccurate and so we do not have certainty here).  The fact that something appears (though we 
need not take ‘appears’ here to denote some sort of visual or image based process) before our 
minds when we think of things requires that these two are mutually exhaustive. But note that the 
mediation process requires a stand-in of sorts, a symbol. And this symbol is given to us 
authentically. For if it was not, we would run afoul in one of two ways. First by an infinite 
regress. If the symbol is not given authentically then it is given through something else, another 
symbol. And that symbol would be given authentically or symbolically. If given symbolically 
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then the question repeats and we find that we have an infinite regress or we must terminate in 
something authentically given. If we answer that this second level symbol is given authentically 
then we find that (due to the definition of our symbol as a stand-in, which is necessitated by our 
division into authentic and inauthentic givenness) the true object of our consciousness was our 
first level symbol and not the object which stands behind it. So we have simply found out that 
what was claimed to be the object of our consciousness was not the object of our consciousness 
and we have reaffirmed and clarified our position (the symbol for the object of our consciousness 
is given to us authentically).  And this authentic givenness is nothing more than the process of 
“seeing.” So even in the claim “I don’t experience or see “seeing” ” it is required that something, 
some object of cognition, be authentically given.  
The last defense of Husserl’s theory is a response to arguments which claim upon 
inspecting what is there to be “seen” universals or essences are not found. Husserl, rather 
pointedly, considers this a form of blindness. He says, “blindness to ideas (essences) is a kind of 
psychic blindness, which through prejudices’ renders us incapable of bringing into the field of 
judgment what we have already in our field of intuition.”102  Willard notes that Husserl did not 
see essences or universal as mysterious at all.103 One of the major forms of prejudicial blindness 
comes from naturalism. Husserl says: 
The spell of the naturalistic point of view, to which all of us at the outset 
are subject and which makes us incapable of prescinding from nature and hence, 
too, of making the psychical an object of intuitive investigation from the pure 
rather than from the psychophysical point of view, has here blocked the road to a 
great science unparalleled in its fecundity, a science which is on the one hand the 
fundamental condition for a completely scientific psychology and on the other the 
field for the genuine critique of reason. The spell of inborn naturalism also 
consists in the fact that it makes it so difficult for all of us to see "essences,' or 
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"ideas"—or rather, since in fact we do, so to speak, constantly see them, for us to 
let them have the peculiar value which is theirs instead of absurdly naturalizing 
them, Intuiting essences conceals no more difficulties or "mystical" secrets than 
does perception.104  
The readily available “natural” world and our overriding, and often understandable, 
concern with practical matters is the natural attitude and it is the foundation for naturalism. 
Looking at essences or taking psychical (mental) experiences as objects of thought is too 
“unnatural.” And so one resolves to look only “naturally” “physically” or pragmatically at the 
data. This can all too easily lead to the claim that natural entities, as well as the methods used to 
explain them, are all that exist. But this is no argument for naturalism or the view that essences 
cannot be clearly brought before one’s intuitive grasp. Husserl, rather than attempting to prove 
that essences are grasped, that “seeing” is legitimate, explains why it is hard and why some think 
it cannot be done. The defense of “seeing” is not through explanation but an insistence that those 
who put forth the effort can gain clarity about it and so “see” that “seeing” is actual.  
Willard also in his own right argued that essences are commonly seen and understood and 
made use of.105 Willard in a lecture titled “What it Means to be Human” gives the example of 
books. He argues that the filing system for books in libraries by author, subject material, etc. (as 
opposed to being filed by something like color or size) is based off of knowledge of the nature or 
essence of books.106 This filing system is not unintuitive nor does it require deep analysis, or 
even a listing of the necessary and sufficient conditions for any X being a book, to understand. It 
“just makes sense.” And no one seems to have any difficulty understanding why these categories 
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are used and not others. This echoes Husserl’s claim that  “Our critics in truth see, and so to 
speak continuously see, “ideas”, “essences” ---makes use of them in thought, formulate 
judgments concerning essences--- only from their epistemological “standpoint” they explain the 
same away.”107
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III. Knowledge 
A. Knowledge and the Acts and Relations of Consciousness that Survive the Reductions 
1. Introduction 
Now we should be equipped to return to our discussion of what it is that survives these 
reductions and how Husserl draws knowledge, the overlap of the subjective with the objective, 
into the field immanence.   It was noted earlier that cognitions do not stand in isolation from each 
other but they stand in relation with other cognitions, cohering with them, supporting them, etc. 
These inter-cognitive relations (as well as intra-cognitive relations) can be given in a pure act of 
“seeing.” And these “seeable” relations will prove most important. Hintikka rightly notes that it 
is erroneous to see the function of the phenomenological reductions as focusing one’s intentions 
on mental objects and blocking out transcendences (Hintikka means metaphysical 
transcendencies here): “Such an exclusive concentration inevitably brackets, not merely 
(metaphysically transcendent) objects, but the relation of noemata (intentional or mental objects) 
to (transcendent) objects.”108 It should also be reemphasized that the aim of the reductions is not 
to block out metaphysically transcendent objects and relations but epistemologically 
transcendent relations.109 
2. Intentionality 
To understand these specific relations, we must first better understand the general inner 
structure of mental acts and their objects. This paper allows for neither a thorough treatment of 
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Husserl’s general theory of intentionality nor for an avoidance of it altogether. A full 
development of the inner structures of consciousness according to Husserl lies outside of the 
scope of this paper. What follows is largely Willard’s development and interpretation of 
Husserl’s position. This is warranted for the focus of this paper is on the application of a 
Willardarin-Husserlian account of knowledge and its application to current epistemology. This 
limitation enables us to avoid a thorough treatment of views which lie outside of Husserl’s 
(including Husserl and Willard’s arguments against these counter views, as well as some of the 
applications and implications of Husserl’s own view). Some mention of these opposing views 
and the problems associated with them (as claimed by Willard and Husserl) will be given in 
order to help clarify and understand their own position. But this should not be taken as a 
refutation of those views. The aim here is only an explication of an HW theory of intentionality 
as it pertains to the possibility of knowledge. .  
It must be remembered that the primary question which concerns Husserl’s philosophical 
works is “How can the objective be grasped by the subjective?” Frederick Olafson correctly 
notes that Husserl was concerned with avoiding the sequestering of both the intentional act and 
the intentional object as being ontologically immanent (what Olafson refers to as the 
“intramental”).110 Husserl’s theory of intentionality was not something developed in separation 
from (and so not something that should be understood apart from) his epistemological work. 
Hence our need to explicate his view (the two are connected). Husserl’s concern is with 
establishing (through the phenomenological method developed above) the connecting of the 
subjective with the objective. Hence his method differs from many of his contemporaries as well 
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as current methodologies. The more influential approach (taken by Husserl’s mentor Brentano 
and others) was quite the opposite from Husserl’s. Brentano tried to explain how one can intend 
things like unicorns even though they do not exist (what I shall call the unicorn problem).111  
Husserl’s starting point, in contrast, was not to try and explain how non-existing things could be 
intended but what it meant for anything at to be intended.   
Their views on intentionality were not entirely opposed though. Willard notes that for 
both Husserl and Brentano the object of an intentional act is part of what makes the act what it is 
(it is part of the acts essence).112 Two intentional acts of consciousness are partly individuated by 
the object they are directed toward or about. In cases where two acts are of or about the same 
thing but differ, they have the same intentional essence but differ in properties which are 
accidental to their intentionality (e.g. their location in time, or in the person which performs the 
act).113 Due to this relation of the act and its object, Brentano’s description of the intentional act 
centered on the object. This explains, in part, Brentano’s focus on the object of intentionality and 
trying to solve the unicorn problem by positing the intentional object as something which is 
always ontologically immanent. Husserl, with his phenomenological method, on the other hand 
focused on the ‘ofness’ or ‘aboutness’ of intentionality (the nature of the act itself, independent 
of all other objects), which contains a specific relationship between the act and its object.114 Thus 
making the object of the act and its existence secondary (without sacrificing the thesis that two 
acts with differing objects cannot be the same or that two acts with the same object must be 
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intentionally the same). Husserl’s theory can then roughly be put in the camp of adverbial 
theories of intentionality.115  
Husserl’s approach to the question then was quite different from Brentano’s or even 
Frege’s. Frege (though his theory was different from Brentano’s) similarly focused on 
explication of a certain type of entity and our interaction with it to explain intentionality. Willard 
helpfully summarizes the difference between Husserl’s methodology in regards to developing a 
theory of intentionality as opposed to Frege’s (though it applies equally well to Brentano’s and to 
the Fregian legacy which lives on through the analytic tradition).  
It is the radical difference on this point which must, above all, be kept in 
mind when comparing Husserl and Frege, and which leads one to think that 
Frege’s views perhaps have little use in the exposition of Husserl. It is, I think, not 
clearly true that “The goal of  Husserlian theory of intentionality is to tell us just 
what kind of entity an act’s content is and to convince us that an experience’s 
involvement with an entity of that kind is both necessary and sufficient for the 
intentionality of the experience.” The goal for Husserl is, instead, to describe 
intentionality in terms of its essential characteristics and differentiations, and in 
relation to the internal complexities of the acts upon which, in its various forms, it 
is founded or essentially depends – the descriptions to be guided by intuition of 
those characteristics, differentiations and inner founding structures themselves.116 
 
a. Noetic and Noematic Intentionality  
As previously mentioned noesis is the structuring process which operates on hyle and it is 
carried out by the noeses. It is responsible for structuring the hyle into intentional experiences 
and serves as the foundation for both knowledge and intentionality.117 Certainly a mere 
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Willard, “Intentionality 1,” 190. 
 
117 Edmund Husserl, Ideas, 176 and Dallas Willard, “Intentionality 1,” 191 and 192.  
50 
representation, or even a stream of representations would not be sufficient for the kind of 
consciousness that would be required for knowledge to be possible (Here the familiar points of 
Searle’s Chinese room thought experiment have application).118 A mere possessing of sensory 
data is not sufficient but a certain kind of possessing them must be in place as well. Hence the 
man in the room though possessing the data (the cards with Chinese on them) does not possess it 
in an appropriate way to be considered to be aware of what is going on or even of 
communication. Husserl says “it is evident a priori… that thinking subjects must be in general 
able to perform, e.g., all sorts of acts in which theoretical knowledge is made real. We must, in 
particular, as thinking beings, be able to see propositions as truths, and to see truths as 
consequences of other truths, and again to see laws as such, to see law as explanatory grounds, 
and to see them as principles, etc.”119 Willard explains that the noetic conditions are what make 
human and any other type of knowing possible.120 Though not all noeses necessarily operate off 
of hyle or sense data (as is the case with humans), the process involved in seeing propositions as 
truth (and the other examples given by Husserl) must be there in order for knowledge to be 
possible.  The noetic component, however, is not the whole of a mental act. Although the noesis 
is the foundation for having a single unified process.  
There are three parts of a mental act as a whole, the hyletic, noetic and neomatic. The 
first two parts have been addressed to some extent (much more will be said about the noetic 
component, though) and the third will be addressed shortly. The noematic part is that which 
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relates to noemata and their relations. A noema is often stated as “the object as intended.”121 It is 
often accompanied by an image or linguistical entity but whether these appear or not it is an 
ontologically immanent object (like the image or linguistical entity, though it is something 
distinct from them).  
In discussing Noemata we must be sure to steer clear of what Willard calls “the common 
assumption” (this is in regards to interpretations of Husserl and his theory of intentionality). The 
assumption is that if a noema is an object then it is the object of the act.122 From this assumption 
two major views develops. The first is that the noema is an object and is therefore the object of 
the act (it is the intended object). This results in Husserl slipping into some form of idealism. The 
second is that the noema (being ontologically immanent) is not the intended object and is 
therefore not an object at all but something along the lines of a Fregian sense. Both views are 
misguided by the same assumption though.123 The noema is an object (it possess predicates) but 
it is not the intentional object.124  
We here enter into what Husserl calls the essential two sidedness of intentionality, the 
noetic and the noematic.125 For Husserl intentionality is a complex stream not a singular strand. 
Much confusion arises from pitting noetic and noematic intentionality against each other (it is 
this area of confusion which leads to seeing Husserl’s later work in Ideas as being a replacement 
to his work in The Logical Investigations and the beginning of his slip away from realism into a 
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form of idealism).126 Let us start with an example and then try to explain Husserl’s position from 
there. 
Imagine seeing a ball on a stand that appears to be blue. The ball then changes to a green 
colour and then again to a red. Upon further inspection it is noticed that several different lights 
are directed at the ball. One is blue, one green, and one red. Now when viewed under a neutral 
light the ball appears white. We now understand that the ball is white and appears to be the 
differing colours because of the lights shining on it. Now when the blue light shines on the ball 
the mental image that we have of the ball will be (most likely) blue. However, the ball will not 
be thought to be blue but rather white. We have here then a case where our mental image does 
not match the object itself but yet is not really misleading either.  
Let us run through the moments of the initial mental act. Sense data is given and received 
and this represents the hyletic phase. The noetic phase follows which interprets the data and 
directs it towards an object, the intentional object. This directing process produces and is then 
accompanied by (as opposed to producing and then being replaced by) the noematic phase which 
produces a noema and often an image or a linguistical entity. The noema has a sense, in the 
Fregeian sense of the term. The noematic phase then includes the generation of an object (i.e. the 
noema) as well as a specific meaning for that object. So in our example the sense data of a blue 
ball is given, this is interpreted as “there being a blue ball” and a specific mental object comes 
onto the scene which is represented by an image. The noema is not an image but is the source of 
that image (the image itself has a specific direction towards the intentional object). This process 
repeats, though differing in minor aspects, for the seeing of the green ball, red ball, the lights, 
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and the white ball. These mental acts, the seeing of a blue ball etc., stand in a specific relation to 
each other. The noesis operates on these individual mental acts, in much the same way as it did 
with the individual datum which composed the hyletic data. It restructures them and forms a new 
intentional object “there being a white ball.” The new intentional object is likewise accompanied 
by a noema and it should be clear that both the noema and the intentional object are produced by 
the noesis. As Willard points out the noetic comes first both in study and in the actual sequence 
of the mental act.127 
The image that we have of the white ball when the blue light is shining on it, after we 
have realized that it is white, may yet be blue. So while the sense data is relevantly similar (it 
does differ in time and almost assuredly to some extent place) to our initial sense data from when 
we first saw it under the blue light, it will nevertheless appear quite different to us (i.e. our 
engagement with it, what we take it to be, is totally different). In this case the intentional object 
and the object as it is intended are different though the sense data remains similar. We can alter 
the case to one of the familiar situations where we see something in the distance or see some 
strange picture but in either case we cannot “make sense” of the data.128 This presents the same 
situation where sensory data remains the same but the object differs (though in this case the 
actual image corresponding to the noema will be different). Likewise there are cases where 
sensory data changes but the intentional object does not, as when the different coloured lights 
shine on the ball but it is understood to be white. These examples serve to show that sensory data 
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and images, or linguistical entities, are not sufficient to determine either the intentional object or 
the object as intended. The above cases show where sensory data changes but both objects 
remain the same and cases where the data remains the same but the objects differ (hopefully the 
remaining two cases, where data and object remain the same and where both differ, are easily 
understood without examples). What this shows is that we think in senses (in this context 
‘senses’ refers to the various possible types of images and linguistical units) but not with them. 
As Willard neatly puts it (along with a helpful analogy): “As Husserl lays out the act/object 
nexus nothing at all is done with the concept in the act of which it is the sense - though a long 
story is to be told about how the various parts of the act function. We walk in steps, not with 
them. Stepping is walking. And fundamentally, we think, perceive, etc., in senses (concepts, 
propositions), not with them.”129  
This allows for Husserl to explain why the objects that we are perhaps naively disposed 
to think of as the objects of our consciousness are ontologically immanent (are objects of our 
consciousness) and do play a complicated part in the acts, but all the while not being the objects 
of our consciousness (it would be hard to imagine what it would be like in the ball example 
above to not have some accompanying image but have identically the same intentional act). We 
are conscious of these things in our mental acts but this does not mean that they must therefore 
be the objects of our acts.130 And noemata are the “enlivened” and used (used in the way that 
Willard above means by “in”) images, concepts, propositions, etc. They are therefore a part of 
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the reellen components of the act, meaning that they are part of the “individual, dependent 
phases or “moments” which, like the whole act itself, are non-sharable and non-repeatable.”131  
Similarly one aspect of the noetic is reellen: the unifying aspect which uniquely fits the 
individual act within a history of acts and makes it this specific act. However, both the noetic and 
the noematic phases also have an irreellen content to them. As irreellen they do belong to the act 
but are not parts of the act.132 The hyletic components as a whole and the noetic and noematic 
components in part belong to the essence of this specific act. Any act identical to A1 contains 
H1, N1, and M1 and any act containing H1, N1, and M1 are identical to A1. They are thus a part 
of the act. However, the irreellen components of the noetic and noematic, N2 and M2, may 
belong to A1 but an acts having N2 and M2 does not mean that it is A1. The irreellen noetic and 
noematic components are those which “belong” to the object of the act.133 They are thus ideal or 
universals.  
Let us return to the white ball example to try and further explicate what was just said. 
Consider the situation where the blue light shines on the ball but we know it to be a white ball. 
Certainly, as was pointed out above, the hyletic components of seeing the ball are non-repeatable 
and non-shareable. Also the image, senses, and the like which correspond to the noematic phases 
of the act are non-shareable. Also the unifying feature of the noesis which fits the act into a 
specific subject’s history of acts is likewise non-repeatable and non-sharable (reflection on the 
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mere fact that the hyletic components are what the noesis operates on and that the noematic 
components are dependent on the noetic ones shows this to be true). However, any act which has 
the white ball as its intentional object will have a similar “intentional direction.” This intentional 
direction is something which belongs to the object itself then rather than the mental acts which 
are thus directed.  
b. Intentional Direction 
Part of the essence of an act is that it has this or that “intentional direction,” (i.e. 
meaning). But the essence of this or that intentional direction is not part of any specific act. 
Willard helpfully shows why this must be.134 If we allow for the essence of the act to be outside 
of the intentional direction then we could have identically the same act but directed at a different 
object (in this case seeing the white ball under the blue and taking it to be blue, as in our first 
case, and seeing it under the blue light but taking it to be white would be the same). But if we 
allow for a specific intentional direction to be indifferent to the types of acts it appears in then 
this would allow for the act to have any content whatever and still be about the same thing. “The 
intentionality of an act has to be its (the acts) essence.”135  But what remains open to us in an act 
of pure intuition, “seeing,” is the fact that differing acts have the same intentional direction. Thus 
the essence of the intentional direction is not a part of the essence of any particular act which has 
that intentionality as its essence. The intentionality of an act is thus part of its reellen and 
irreellen parts.  
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It is on the basis of this insight that Husserl argued against psychologism. (Husserl’s 
rejection of psychologism was another of his career defining and theory shaping beliefs. It 
worked alongside and was intimately connected to his concern with the grasping of the objective 
in the subjective.) The objects and relations under investigation by the logician are the objects of 
her thoughts or mental acts, her non-sharable non-repeatable thoughts. But upon 
phenomenological investigation she can see that the objects of her investigation remain the same 
under many different acts (one must remember that the mental acts are non-repeatable even for 
her). These logical entities are then something which transcend her individual thoughts (the 
reellen components). They can be grasped by multiple minds, hence Quine’s and Husserl’s 
assertions about modus ponens are about the same thing.136 The noetic process leading one to a 
grasp of these logical realities may be, indeed must be, different for each person and even the 
same person at different times. Yet they all share in participating in a common essence of some 
intentionality, or meaning or intentional direction.  
What this shows is that objects and relations which survive the reductions are of two 
types, ontologically immanent (the reellen components of a mental act) and ontologically 
transcendent (the irreellen and ideal components). The ideal are universals since they can be 
multiply instantiated, “identically the same in many acts.”137 For Husserl, then, what matters is 
                                                     
136 And it would seem Quine, at certain points, even agreed with this: “The thinness of the account of how 
those (logical) laws may be so understood is due to the fact that in the works cited above he (Quine) is coming to 
them von oben, from his speculative theory of language and mind, not von unten, from an examination of those laws 
themselves. When dealing with the laws themselves, on the other hand, as is done in writings which engage with 
logic as a field of scientific research, a quite different picture of logical law emerges. When one examines any of 
Quine's expositions or proofs of logical laws, one finds that they are presented as theoretically complete without a 
single reference to, or invocation of support from, any psychological matter of fact. We will make just a few 
comments about his actual procedure in the process of logical research and exposition, since his writings in this field 
are so well known.” See Dallas Willard, “ The Case Against Quine's Case for Psychologism,” in Perspectives in 
Psychologism, edited by Mark Notturno, (New York: E. J. Brill, 1989).  
 
137 Ibid., 188. 
58 
that through the reductions the objects of our mental acts are brought into epistemological 
immanence. But ontologically eminent objects are not brought into this epistemological 
immanence in any special way as distinct from ontologically transcendent objects. Husserl then 
differs drastically from Kant in this way who seems to offer no real explanation for, or 
clarification of, the connection between sense data and the concepts which emerge from them. 
The connection of the minds “grasp” or knowledge of these clearly ontologically immanent 
relations remains obscure. Willard’s comments and quotes on Husserl here are invaluable: 
 “He (Husserl) points out that Kant tried to “save” knowledge, show that it 
is possible, before determining what it is, “before subjecting it to a clarifying 
critique and analysis of essence” (Logical Investigations 833). This is further 
traced to Kant’s failure to get clear on the specific nature of “pure Ideation, the 
adequate survey of conceptual essences, and the laws of universal validity rooted 
in those essences” (Ibid.). On Husserl’s view, such a failure is built into any effort 
that is not “a critique based on “seeing” ” (Idea of Phenomenology 50).”138 
 
3. Knowledge 
a. Authentic and Symbolic Knowledge 
We are now ready to consider Husserl’s theory of knowledge. Hopefully what has been 
said already concerning intentionality and the phenomenological method as a whole will provide 
ease of insight into Husserl’s thoughts here on this matter.  
It is time to revisit some of the concepts that we dealt with in the preceding sections. It 
was argued that the objects of consciousness fall into one of two types, either authentically given 
or inauthentically given (i.e. to be given symbolically). We also mentioned earlier that one of the 
important things which survives the reductions are relations between mental acts and that the 
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function of the reductions is not to exclude transcendences in the ontological sense but in the 
epistemological sense. It remains, therefore, for the intentional object to be given symbolically 
and to be given authentically. And the recognition of a certain relation between these 
experiences, the moving from the inauthentic to the authentic, to be laid open in a pure act of 
“seeing.” In short the recognition of this relation between two acts is knowledge. Willard 
succinctly puts it as “Knowing is… finding something to be as it is thought to be.”139 And this 
can occur in one of two ways. The first is when the latter act contains an act of pure intuition and 
the second is when the nature of a specific type of symbolic representation is given to us and a 
specific symbolic representation of that type directs us to a concept (though that concept itself is 
not given in an act of pure intuition). As Willard points out it is therefore wrong to attribute the 
view to Husserl that all knowledge rests on a state of intuition: “We must, then, permanently set 
aside the misunderstanding that, for him (Husserl), knowledge of a truth, a state of affairs or an 
object, either is or requires an intuition of it.140  
It is here that our talk of the inauthentic (i.e. symbolic) and authentic and Husserl’s work 
in mathematics is most helpful. Small numbers are easily grasped in intuition, such as the 
number 2. And the specific relation “2 < 4” is also easily grasped in intuition. But large numbers 
such as 3,141,592,653 are just beyond our intuitive grasp. And the relation specified by 
“3,141,592,653 < 5,897,932,384” is just not something we can bring into our intuitive grasp 
(similar examples can be construed in logic). While a simple argument demonstrating modus 
ponens may be grasped in intuition a twenty or thirty step proof is not. Hence in working with 
one of these longer proofs the simple steps are merely referred to without actually having to 
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write them out (e.g. we write the conclusion of an instance of hypothetical syllogism and merely 
reference the lines we used and ‘HS’ on the side). This is normal and acceptable because those 
moves can be “seen,” intuitively tracked. But the argument as a whole (the twenty or so steps) 
needs to be broken down into these smaller bits. After that we can know that it is valid. But we 
know this not through an intuition of the two or three premises and the conclusion and their 
relation (as in modus ponens and the like) but through our understanding of these smaller steps 
and their relation to the whole.  
Husserl points out in regards to mathematics (and the same can be said for logic) that if 
these relations could be drawn into intuitive grasp then the processes of arithmetic would be 
superfluous.141 “Indeed, the whole sum of arithmetic is… nothing other than a sum of artificial 
devices for overcoming the essential imperfections of our intellect.”142 Hence even after our 
logical proof it would be odd and unacceptable to refer to these twenty or so steps as something 
like ‘A1’ and use it in a longer forty or so step proof. What is of special note here is that the oft 
given paradigm of knowledge (mathematics) largely rests on this symbolic representations. 
In both of these cases (the mathematical examples and the logical examples) what can be 
brought into intuition is the symbolic system used to represent these numbers or propositions and 
their relations. And so knowledge of these sorts of truths, states of affairs or objects which stand 
outside our intuitive grasp can be known by us when the nature of the symbolic form of thinking 
which represents (where the mental act does not include its object as an epistemologically 
immanent content) the truth, state of affairs or object is known to us, that is brought into intuitive 
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grasp.143 “It is, Husserl thinks, only our experience of symbolic representations passing over into 
authentic consciousness of their objects that gives us the concept of sign, and then makes us 
“familiar with that practical equivalence between authentic representations and their symbols 
which make possible the use of the latter in place of the former.” ”144 The symbol system of logic 
or mathematics (or any other symbol system) must be brought into intuitive grasp for them to 
function in extending our knowledge to things which we cannot bring into intuitive grasp.145 
Insight into these knowledge advancing relations of symbol to symbol and symbol to object are 
“logical.”146 The grasping of things like dependency and independency, genus and species (in the 
Aristotelian sense of the terms) and the like, are logical insights which hold true to the developed 
symbolic forms of representation and to the things themselves. Thus it is true that all knowledge 
rests on evidenz but it is not true that all objects of knowledge must be brought into a mental act 
as an epistemologically immanent object (the symbol, under the previously specified guidelines, 
is sufficient).147  
b. The Knowledge Relationship 
It was stated previously that knowledge is the relation between an act in which an object 
is not given and an act in which it is either given authentically or through the appropriate symbol. 
What was spelled out above was the “appropriateness” of symbolic giving and that something is 
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given symbolically does not epistemically demote it; “In the (symbolic) practice of arithmetic 
one senses no loss of epistemic status upon abandoning the “numbers themselves” along with 
actual operations on them.”148 What remains now is for us to provide a further explication of this 
relation.  
There are three fundamental components which make this relation possible. The mental 
act which intends the object as such, the mental act which contains the intuition of the intended 
object (understood as being inclusive of the appropriate symbolic types of givenness dealt with 
above), and the mental act which unites these two previous acts. Without the former two the 
latter would not be possible but it is the latter act which is referred to as ‘knowing;’ “An act of 
knowing consciously incorporates that relation between thought and intuition.”149 In all three of 
these acts the selfsame object is the intentional object. The first act intends an object but the 
intended object may or may not exist. As we pointed out Husserl’s theory of intentionality 
(falling roughly in the adverbial set of theories) allows for the intentional object to not exist. The 
thought still has an intentional direction but that “road” may or may not lead anywhere. Thus the 
first act stands as an empty intention. The second act involves the ‘givenness’ of the intentional 
object which allows for no inexistence of the object. In this case the mental act draws something 
(which is often ontologically transcendent) into epistemological immanence. The third act then 
relates these two act together. Thus knowledge is a higher order act of cognition, showing that 
the empty intuition has found its fulfillment in the latter intuition. Knowledge then for Husserl is 
often denoted by the term ‘fulfillment.’150 It is an act distinct from the first two. It has the same 
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object as the first two but is related to it in a different way. The first merely intends it, the object, 
the second finds it, the third finds it to be as it was intended to be. Willard again beautifully 
summarizes this and provides a helpful example: 
The fulfillment of the thought – the “knowing” involved – is my 
consciousness of this object, the pen in the desk, as being as thought. The thought 
or “empty intention” is what is fulfilled, and the intuition is what “gives” the 
thought its fulfillment. But fulfillment (knowledge) is still a relation to the object, 
even though it rests or is “founded” upon a kind of “gathering up” or “synthesis” 
of other cognitive acts directed upon the same object.151  
 While I used ‘intentional direction’ earlier in order to stay with current terminology it 
might be better put ‘intentional velocity.’ Direction tends to mean or imply towards or away 
from something. Velocity has speed and direction but it has nothing to do with whether, say an 
arrow, will reach any given target or thing whatsoever. Some objects on some velocity simply 
will not reach anything at all. Intentionality is the same way. It has a specific type of 
intentionality (desiring blue, repulsion at blue, believing in blue, etc.). It also has a certain 
direction (in the previous cases all directed at blue). But just as an arrow with a given velocity 
imparts no relation to its target so also intentionality has no relation to its target (i.e. the 
intentional object). Hence the inexistence of the intentional object is possible (such as is the case 
when we believe in Pegasus). But the mental act which has the intentional “velocity” of 
believing in and being about Pegasus has those properties (as the arrow with no existing target 
has the properties of speed and direction). The knowledge relation on the other hand does have 
an actual relation to the object of knowledge (albeit an external relation) hence it allows for no 
inexistence of the object. An external relation allows for the relatum to pass in and out of the 
relation without losing its identity (e.g. the ball that is hit by a bat).152 In being related to the act 
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which takes it as its object, the object of knowledge has a property attributed to it that it did not 
have before (i.e. being known by X). And since this object has properties it must exist; “nothing 
can have properties and not exist.”153 This provides the basis for a comparison between an act 
which merely intends an object and an act which intuits the object. It allows for the “possibility 
of comparing object with meaning and of observing the agreement or disagreement between the 
conceptualization and its determinatively qualified object.”154    
For Husserl, having distinguished between the two types of transcendence/immanence, 
there is no real difference between bringing an ontologically transcendent object into intuitive 
grasp as opposed to an immanent one. It is simply a question of what one takes as their 
intentional object. Hardy says “Transcendence is no longer the problem of reaching out from one 
part of the world (the ontologically immanent) to another (the ontologically transcendent), but 
the transcendence of a pure consciousness to which both the empirical object and the empirical 
subject appear.”155 The backing for this is again by going through the reductions and “seeing” 
what happens. Our cognition of intramental events and objects has the same essence as our 
cognition of extramental events and objects. The key for Husserl is to bring this essence before 
one minds and then recognize it in its instances. “Only if the essence of this relation is 
somewhere given to him, so that he could see it, so that the unity of knowing and the known 
object, which is suggested by the phrase “making contact with reality” (Triftigkeit), would itself 
stand right before his eyes. Then he would have knowledge about its possibility, rather this 
possibility would be clearly given to him.”156 The essence of knowledge is revealed and it 
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becomes possible for us to recognize its instances. As Willard says “That possibility (The 
possibility of knowledge) is just the possibility of the mind fully coming… into direct relation 
with what is not a part of, not genuinely (reell) contained in, the relevant acts directed upon 
it.”157 
c. A Comparison to Kant 
 Hence Husserl’s criticizes Kant’s attempt to save knowledge because “Kant tried to 
“save” knowledge (show that it is possible) before determining what it is, “before subjecting it to 
a clarifying critique and analysis of essence.” ”158 Interestingly Kant took an approach similar to 
Husserl’s when investigating morality. His Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morality ignores 
all human conditions and their relations to morality and seeks to gain a clear view of morality 
itself (the essence of morality). The essence of morality must be laid bare and then its connection 
and relation to the human condition can be understood. Kant never really questioned whether 
morality was possible for humans but he did recognize that one must get a grip on morality itself 
first. Surely we can say that just as contingent human factors may change the way morality is 
applied (something Kant deals with in The Metaphysics of Morals) these contingent factors could 
also make morality impossible or inapplicable for humans (as Kant would admit to be the case if 
all Humans were arrational sponges or something of the sort).  
 
 
                                                     
156 Edmund Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, (Hardy), 29. 
 
157 Dallas Willard, “Knowledge,” 159. 
 
158 Ibid., 160 (The quote of Husserl is from LI 833).  
66 
Kant, at least attempted, to get clear on the essence of morality before proceeding to 
human morality.159 In relation to knowledge though he did not properly “reduce” the question, 
seeking to get a grip on knowledge itself (i.e. the essence of knowledge, and come to terms with 
the methodology one must embrace to do so).  
“The question that initially drove us is also reduced… not how can I, this 
person, in my experiences, make contact with a being in itself, something that 
exists out there, outside of me; in place of this question… we have now a pure 
basic question: how can the pure phenomenon of knowledge make contact with 
something that is not immanent to it how can the absolute self-givenness of 
knowledge make contact with something that is not self-given, and how is this 
contact to be understood?”160    
All attempts, such as Kant’s, Frege’s, and what seems to have become the analytic 
tradition (they all start from a postulation of what must be in place and are tied to the process of 
explanation) to account for knowledge are doomed to fail from the outset. This stems from what 
we pointed out above is a mistaken μεταβασι. “If this shifting (shifting to a false μεταβασι) is 
to be avoided, and we are to remain focused on the sense of the question concerning this 
possibility, the phenomenological reduction is required.”161    
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B. Conclusion 
Husserl then has given us a description of the essence of knowledge. A description of 
what it would mean for God, angels, hippos or humans to know something. This provides us 
with an account of the possibility of knowledge. And by the phenomenological method we can 
“see” it take place in our own consciousness. That shows that knowledge is actual in human life. 
That things can come before our mind and we can grasp them. And so “Exactly what recourse do 
we have but: “Zu dem Sachen selbst (to the things themselves)!”162 Lee Hardy summarizes 
Husserl approach to the problem of knowledge as dealing with the possibility of transcendence 
and the problem concerning correspondence. 163   The first is solved by means of a theory of 
intentionality and the second is solved by the phenomenological approach which allows for 
“seeing” and the higher order act of synthesis between a merely intentional act and the intuition 
which stand as its fulfillment. What remains now is for us to apply Husserl’s theory to the 
current discussion of epistemology.  
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IV. HUSSERL, WILLARD, AND THE CURRENT DISCUSSION 
A. Investigation of Noetic Conditions as Opposed to a Definitional Approach 
We noted above that Husserl’s emphasis was on the question concerning the possibility 
of knowledge and not on listing the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge that 
characterize current epistemology. Willard followed suit in this regards. His oft made claim that 
Knowledge is “the capacity to represent a respective subject matter as it is on an appropriate 
basis of thought and/or experience” leaves out entirely the fine points of “appropriateness” that 
are the major and fundamental concerns of current epistemology.164 He also went on to say that: 
What constitutes an “appropriate basis” will vary from subject matter to 
subject matter, of course, as is generally acknowledged of the corresponding 
methods of inquiry. It is, no doubt, impossible to define “appropriate basis” in any 
perfectly general way, or even to specify perfectly general necessary and 
sufficient conditions for having an appropriate basis. Certainly I will make no 
attempt to do so here. However, a few things may be said about the necessary 
conditions of knowledge and knowing, without attempting to be definitional or 
even comprehensive. 165 
Both Husserl and Willard were more concerned about responding to and refuting views 
which undermined certain necessary conditions of knowledge than with offering a definition of 
knowledge itself. (Willard’s remark above that he “would not do so here” seems to hold for all of 
his work; it just wasn’t something he was concerned with.) Both of them were concerned with 
rebutting the claims of the naturalistic and relativistic views of their time. For Husserl this was 
primarily in regards to psychologism and the atheistic naturalism which developed into logical 
positivism. For Willard it was in regards to the various forms of naturalism and scientism (both 
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of which were strongly connected to the logical positivist movement which developed during 
Husserl’s life).166 Though neither of them were concerned with such definitional work it does not 
seem that they were necessarily opposed to it either (though we will have to make some 
allowances for both of their discussions on noetic structures). Willard’s quote above may make it 
seem like he was opposed to trying to flesh out necessary and sufficient conditions but two 
things must be understood about this quote.  
First of all though he did not hold the full listing of the necessary and sufficient 
conditions needed for a “definition” of knowledge to be possible this does not mean that 
discussion on such things are not worthwhile or that progress cannot be made in discussing them. 
Part of both Husserl’s and Willard’s concern with current epistemology (in their own respective 
times) was that it was starting on the false μεταβασι discussed above and that it overlooked the 
question concerning the possibility of knowledge. What was necessary for real progress to be 
made was to start from the right questions and develop the correct methodology based off of and 
necessitated by this fundamental question and then to proceed from there. To start with a list of 
the necessary and sufficient conditions and proceed to testing it with barn facades, clocks, and 
beliefs in other minds, is, at least it was to them, to overlook the most important aspects of 
knowledge and doom oneself to making no real substantial progress.  
Second, the important role of the noesis developed above takes place within a complex 
and “messy” “web of life.”167 A helpful example here is what often transpires when attempting to 
teach logic. One can explain the principles of inference and modus ponens and one student “gets 
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it” and another does not. One tries example after example and then suddenly, there it is, it 
“clicks.” The concept is understood. The student knows and can represent modus ponens on an 
appropriate basis. But what one student needed to noetically “connect the dots,” to be lead to the 
universal concept, is different from the other (i.e. the noetic conditions upon which they come to 
understand the concept are different). Why did one student get it early on but not the other? A 
spelling out of the sufficient conditions for an “appropriate basis” would have to offer an 
explanation here. 
 Certainly a spelling out of all the “appropriate” noetic conditions for which one could 
come to know something as simple as modus ponens is out of reach. It seems, furthermore, like 
even developing a general heading under which they could all fit (so that one could say “If one 
has noetic conditions of type X then one knows modus ponens”) is also unattainable. Willard 
points out that the very noetic structures of creative genius, as exemplified in persons like 
Einstein, just seem fundamentally out of our reach in terms of our ability to explain and 
categorize. “This (inability), I believe, is why it is impossible to lay down general sufficient 
conditions of an “appropriate basis.” ”168 But this does not imply that discussions of noetic 
structures are to be avoided all together or that they are all entirely in vain. Willard would only 
seem to be against attempts to fit noetic structures into a box, so to speak. Now this, it seems, is 
exactly what is going on in much of current epistemology. Trying to formulate criteria for which 
all noetic structures must fall under (consider that theories of epistemology are normative 
concerning noetic structures). Alvin Plantinga points out that this judging of noetic structures is 
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the case for foundationalism.169 Willard concurred with Plantinga’s statement and extended it to 
“the many versions of coherentism, verificationism, Aufbau projects, social constructionism, 
externalism, internalism, and “linguistic rule” theories.”170 The assumption is that we all want to 
be and ought to be rational (I’m not here challenging this assumption, just drawing attention to 
it). And these theories flesh out the conditions for rational belief. Thus much of the normative 
discussion is perhaps obscured under talk of rationality.171  The normative aspect though in 
contemporary discussions are about specifying the conditions for which all noetic structures 
ought to fall under.  
B. HW and Reformed Epistemology  
The outlier in this regards in the current discussion is reformed epistemology. Reformed 
epistemology rejects normative noetic structures which reject belief in God as properly basic but, 
(and most important to the current discussion) it makes no attempt to offer a replacement 
criterion. (Reformed epistemology does not reject normative noetic structures entirely though. 
Hence they are an outlier but only in the sense of defining the conditions for a normative noetic 
structure) Plantinga helpfully points this out by comparing the Reformed epistemologist to the 
person who rejects the positivist’s verification criterion for meaningfulness without offering a 
replacement formula.172 It is important to note that Plantinga shows that this does not commit the 
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Reformed epistemologist to accepting any belief as basic or (in line with our current discussion) 
any noetic structure as normatively in the clear (i.e. rational).173  
So where does this leave us? Plantinga’s view is that rational noetic structures are to be 
advanced not by a universal statement which captures all rational structures of belief (again 
given what said above concerning Einstein and creative genius how could we?) but by 
induction.174 His view is that progress is to be made from “below rather than from above.”175 
What he means is that we start with beliefs that we are rational in holding and find other beliefs 
that are similar to them, accepting them as rationally in the clear, and reject other beliefs which 
are dissimilar on that basis (though they may be rationally supported by some other process). 
This seems to get us on the right track and is perfectly consistent with Husserl and Willard. What 
phenomenology offers us though is a science of analyzing those specific noetic structures and a 
means of grasping their essence. This is a “below” method since it starts with an investigation of 
mental acts, their objects, essences, etc. The phenomenological method offers deep going 
cognitive analysis which supplements the inductive method proposed by Plantinga.  
C. Opposition to HW’s compatibility with Externalism 
1. Introduction 
Now the point just developed shows that Husserl and Willard are compatible with certain 
forms of externalism (though not forms of externalism which seek to have a corner on the market 
concerning noetic structures). But it is commonly held that both Willard and Husserl are firmly 
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entrenched internalists.176 This claim will be challenged on two lines, the first is that the 
lingocentric process of justification in most internalist theories is incompatible with Husserl and 
Willard's approach. And the second is that a clearer understanding of intentionality for Husserl 
and Willard, and the development of an intentionality threshold, both open Willard and Husserl 
to externalist theories.  
2. Lingocentric Justification 
“True opinions are a fine thing and do all sorts of good so long as they 
stay in their place, but they will not stay long. They run away from a man’s mind; 
so they are not worth much until you tether them by working out the reason…. 
Once they are tied down, they become knowledge, and are stable. That is why 
knowledge is something more valuable than right opinion. What distinguishes one 
from the other is the tether.” Plato177  
Phillip Olsen rightly points out that what makes up this tether (the listing of the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for it) is much debated but that articulate reflection is one of the 
necessary materials for the classic internalist.178  By ‘articulate reflection’ Olsen means “the 
ability to provide reasons for believing the things one rightly believes.”179 In current philosophy 
the providing of reasons has been closely linked to the ability to provide a linguistical framework 
(both in one’s own mind and so naturally in speech as well) which explains those reasons. Hence 
Olsen sees it fit to substitute ‘articulate reflection’ for “the ability to provide reasons for 
believing the things one rightly believes.” The linguistical component is at least implied, and 
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perhaps required by, the ability to provide the reasons. In the case of chicken sexers (supposed 
persons who can tell the sex of chicken that will hatch from an egg) Olsen says “The conditions 
that make the chicken sexer’s skill possible and successful remain mysterious and inarticulate—
in the sense that the chicken sexer cannot ‘‘state’’ or ‘‘express’’ her reasons for judging that a 
particular chick is male or female.”180 And again note the emphasis on a linguistical foundation: 
“If the skill were to become articulate, if chicken sexers were able to explain the principles 
according to which their skill operate, the value of the skill might increase as its usefulness in 
practices, inquires, and activities other (emphasis in original) than chicken sexing becomes 
apparent.”181 Similarly what Plantinga and other reformed epistemologists reject is that they need 
to provide some sort of explanation, some stated criteria, for why belief in God is properly basic 
and belief in the Great Pumpkin and other such things are not. Olsen’s article deals with a vast 
range of authors and it is worth reading to see that the common (but rarely explicitly expressed) 
view is that if something is not or was not a linguistical mental act then it fails to provide an 
appropriate basis for being a reason. Hookway’s division between inquiry and knowledge is 
linguistical; Sosa’s division between knowing and knowing full-well and Zagzebski’s division 
between higher and lower knowledge are both linguistical; Code’s comments on understanding 
and knowledge also imply a linguistical division.182  
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This emphasis on articulate reflection is connected to what has become the standard view 
in contemporary philosophy: thought or reasoning is linguistical.183 Hence what is internal to the 
knower (open to her consciousness) must be linguistical. To suppose that she has justification is 
to imply that she can articulately reflect. To say that something is external to her seems to mean 
that it is not on or open to her linguistical/conscious radar. So to the extent to which one would 
reject the requirement of articulate reflection for knowledge then one would be categorized an 
externalist and to the extent that they would accept it, they would be an internalist.184 Because of 
Husserl and Willard’s insistence on the openness to consciousness of one’s “tether” for 
knowledge it is assumed that they are internalist in a fairly standard sense. However, there is a 
strong rejection of this lingocentric model in Husserl (which was adopted and heavily 
emphasized by Willard). This in turn opens them up to some forms of externalism. 
Perhaps the best example here is in regards to Plantinga and the sensus divinitatis.185 
Plantinga says the sensus divinitatis is something which “in a wide variety of circumstances 
produces in us beliefs about God.”186 This is widely considered to be an externalist theory due to 
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its rejection of any need to provide articulate reflection or meet the classic evidentialist’s 
standards of basicality. However, this theory is not out of place in a Husserlian/Willardarian 
(HW) model. Plantinga himself compares this type of belief formation to that of beliefs 
concerning logic, specifically modus ponens.187 What the phenomenologist has to offer here 
(once again) is a way of reflecting on this process of belief formation that can draw it into 
clarification. Just as Husserl and Willard held that there is a type of eidetic blindness there may 
also be type of spiritual blindness (as Calvin, Aquinas, and Plantinga have all seemed to argue). 
This does not mean that a HW approach implies or is implied by Plantinga’s theory but only that 
it is compatible with it. Husserl’s statements on belief formation in logic, specifically the 
essential mental acts and relations which represent them, and Plantinga’s statements on logic and 
belief in God display this common thread.188 For believers in God it might just be that there our 
symbolic situations (e.g. the contemplation of the starry heavens or the moral law within) which 
can lead to the appropriate grasp of the existence of God and provide a proper foundation for 
belief in him.  
Now one objection here that should be dealt with is that Husserl’s insistence on the 
understanding of methods which lead us to truth through phenomenological insight to be had in 
order for those methods to produce knowledge.189 Let us quote Husserl at length to best 
understand his position here.  
Following such a path of insight, and with constant reference to the 
peculiarities of our mental constitution, the pioneers of research discover methods 
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which they justify once and for all. When this has been done, such methods can 
be used without insight, so to say mechanically, in each given case: an objectively 
correct result is assured. This far-reaching reduction of insight to mechanism in 
our thought-processes leads to an indirect mastery over those endlessly winding 
paths of thought that admit of no direct mastery: such a reduction rests on the 
psychological nature of signitive-symbolic thinking. It plays an immeasurable role 
in the construction of blind mechanisms, e.g. the rules for the four arithmetical 
Operations, and for higher operations with decimals, where a result emerges, 
perhaps with the help of logarithmic or geometric functional tables, but without 
assistance from insight. But it also plays a part in contexts where insight guides 
our researches and our proofs…These surrogative, operational concepts which 
turn signs into a kind of counters, preside exclusively over the most extensive 
fields of arithmetical thought and research. They represent a vast easing of the 
latter, they take them down from the exhausting heights of abstraction to 
comfortable, intuitive ways, where imagination, guided by insight, can move, 
within the limits of rules, with freedom and with relative effortlessness, as in 
regulated games. One should point, in this connection, to the revolutionary 
thought-economy which occurs in the purely mathematical disciplines, when 
genuine thought is replaced by surrogative, signitive thinking, an economy which 
leads imperceptibly to formal generalizations of our original thought-trains, and 
even of our sciences. In this manner, almost without specially directed mental 
labour, deductive disciplines arise having an infinitely enlarged horizon. Out of 
arithmetic, the original theory of numbers and numerical magnitudes, a 
generalized, formal arithmetic arises in more or less spontaneous fashion: in this 
numbers and magnitudes no longer count as basic concepts, but in this numbers 
and magnitudes no longer count as basic concepts, but merely as chance objects 
of application. Fully conscious reflection now takes over, and the pure theory of 
manifolds emerges as a further extension. In its form this covers all possible 
deductive systems: the form-system of formal arithmetic is merely one of its 
special instances. 
To analyse these and like types of method, and fully to clarify their 
achievement, is perhaps the most beautiful and least developed field in the theory 
of science, the extremely important, instructive theory of deductive method (of 
mathematical method in the widest sense). We do not of course get to do this 
through mere generalities, through vague talk of the surrogative function of signs, 
of mechanisms which save energy etc.: deep-going analyses are everywhere 
needed.190 
What this quotation shows is that Husserl held that mathematical and other similar types 
of symbolic thinking, such as logic, are developed (that is they actually have historically 
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developed this way) by insight, “seeing.” Hence they do produce knowledge. What was lacking 
was a clarification of how these types of research do so. It was this task of clarification which 
Husserl set out to do in the “Philosophy of Arithmetic.” It was not the case that insight was 
lacking in the field of mathematics but that insight into this insight was lacking. Tied to this point 
is that Willard points out that on a Husserlian framework you can know x without knowing that 
you know x.191 Hence, insight into God’s existence can be achieved for some without insight into 
this insight.192 This would just make belief in God just one of the many areas where “deep-going 
analysis” is needed. Just like the mathematician could “see” certain deductive relations and 
proceed from this genuine insight without insight into the nature of this “seeing” so belief in God 
can proceed the same way. And it would be a mistake, on the basis of a lack of insight into 
insight (or knowing how you know that) to disregard the belief on that basis. 
 What Husserl is concerned with excluding as knowledge is people who are, for example, 
told to write down certain numbers and symbols and then perform mathematical operations but 
have no understanding of what anything means or why they are doing it, regardless of the 
reliability of their operations. Perhaps a good example here is where certain formulas are 
memorized when learning algebra but no explanation is given as to what they mean, what they 
stand for, why they work, etc. This aspect of Husserl’s thought would certainly cause tension 
between Husserl and some externalist theories (particularly naturalistic ones, which claim 
reliability alone to be sufficient for knowledge). But I see no point of contention here between 
Husserl and Plantinga but rather great concord. Plantinga requires a certain “maturity” for the 
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sensus divinitatis to work and again compares it with arithmetical knowledge. The objection that 
HW is necessarily opposed to all aspects of externalism then is unfounded and rests on a 
confusion between insight and insight into types of insight.  
Lastly, this again shows the disconnect between articulate reflection and the HW model. 
Just as the small child may have real insight into why 2+2=4 but not be able to adequately 
articulate it, especially if we raise questions concerning his use not of the numbers themselves 
but of symbols (i.e. ‘2’, ‘+’, ‘=’ and ‘4’), so in other areas of knowledge where it is based on real 
insight there need not be any reliance upon some standard of articulation.  
3. Intentionality and the Intentionality Threshold 
The second challenge to HW being incompatible with aspects of certain externalist 
theories centers on the theory of intentionality it employs. The error being addressed here largely 
stems from Heidegger’s criticism of Husserl. A criticism which was influential to the 
existentialism of Heidegger, Sartre and others.  To begin with it is helpful to look at Heidegger 
and his theory of intentionality.  
Heidegger saw Husserl as standing at the head of a long line of philosophy which went 
back to Descartes, where the ego is a “spectator.” 193 Heidegger’s theory of intentionality must 
be first and foremost be seen as a reaction against the Cartesian mode of thinking which 
considers man as basically a subject contemplating objects.194 Primarily, both in terms of that 
which is most foundational and that which is most common, humans are not beings which 
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194 Martin Heidegger, “Being and Time,” in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell, (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1977), 69. 
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analyze things, like hammers, but beings which simply are thrown into the world, Geworfenheit, 
and then function in that environment (often without being conscious of how one functions in 
such a way). 195  This is to say they exist and function without being subjects contemplating 
objects. In contemplating objects subjects have an intentional direction towards them. So for 
Heidegger persons fundamentally exist: unintentionally, merely using or coping with objects.  
As Hubert Dreyfus points out, this basic and unintentional way of living is “so pervasive 
and constant that he (Heidegger) simply calls it being-in-the-world.”196 This sub-intentional 
coping is the standard modus operandi and the most basic way of being, from which all other 
forms arise. Individuals remain in this mode unless they encounter some sort of difficulty (e.g. a 
door handle not working). Upon such an encounter a person then become intentional and 
functions along the lines of the Cartesian paradigm, as a thinking subjects contemplating objects 
(that is to say, they become intentional). Dreyfus and Heidegger both agree that as the skill of the 
person increases in regards to the situation they are in they become less and less likely to rise to 
the intentional level.197 This lack of intentionality because of the presence of skill (as opposed to 
the mere lack of problems) is called skilled coping.198 The threshold for shifting from 
unintentional to intentional being, which is a combination of both the difficulty of the event and 
the skill of the agent, I shall call the threshold of intentionality (All actions then will either fall 
above this line, thus being intentional, or fall below it, thus being unintentional, for Heidegger at 
                                                     
195 Hubert Dreyfus, "Heidegger's Critique of the Husserl/Searle Account of Intentionality," Social Research 
60, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 37. 
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197 Ibid., 34. 
 
198 Ibid., 28. 
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least.). What is of note here is that for Heidegger the primary, the basic way, of being in the 
world is an unintentional one. For Husserl it is intentional.  
The relevancy of this to our current discussion is that it makes Husserl appear to be 
someone who is committed to the view that the reasons for our beliefs and actions are something 
for which we are consciously aware of all the time. This would again lend itself to Husserl being 
labeled an internalist of sorts. (Which is of course against our thesis that HW has application to 
both sides of the current discussion which puts it in a unique position to combine insights from 
both internalism and externalism.) There are two problems with arguing from this view of 
Husserl’s theory of intentionality to internalism.  
a. Problem One: Non-Linguistic Intentionality 
Along the lines of the previous section, there is a great divorce between Husserl and 
current lingocentric models of thought. Just because we are aware of objects and have an 
intentionality which is related to them in some way (this “related to them in some way” will be 
flushed out more fully shortly) it does not mean that we have or experience some mental 
articulation of them. Consciousness just is not inherently articulate. Hence there can always be a 
breakdown between what we are aware of (what is open to us in an act of intuition or being used 
in symbolic representation) and what we can articulate (what we can bring into articulate 
reflection). This was precisely what was going on in the case concerning mathematics, dealt with 
in detail above. There was real insight into the nature of mathematics but there was a lack of 
insight into how this insight was brought about. So while there was knowledge being advanced 
there was not an understanding of how that knowledge was being advanced (This lack of a 
higher order knowledge clearly necessitated that there be a lack in articulate reflection). Husserl 
clearly was not attempting to advance knowledge of mathematics in the usual sense (by coming 
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up with new mathematical theories). He was concerned with developing a metamathematical 
theory (i.e. with providing an account of the advancement of knowledge in mathematics). 
There is also “(a) “marginal” type of subordinate awareness.”199 Willard’s example is of 
our awareness of the letters and symbols on a page.200 The letters and symbols are objects, they 
have properties, we use them, our intentions are placed on them, but they are not the objects of 
our intentions. This draws us back to the confusion brought about by the “common assumption,” 
that if noemata are objects they are the objects of our intentions. This assumption is false. They 
are objects but they are not the objects of our intentions. Yet they nevertheless “bear” our 
intentions (i.e. they are part of the intentional stream). These subordinate objects (such as the 
letters on a page) then bear intentionality in a way analogous to neomata. The problem is that the 
common assumption holds that if something, some object, bears intentionality, then it is the 
intentional object (this is a more general statement of the common assumption given earlier, 
earlier it was limited only to noemata). And the intentional object is something which we are 
aware of in the fullest sense, not in a “marginal” or “subordinate” way. Hence for Heidegger 
(since he sees no subordinate type of awareness and represents the more common view of an 
intentional beam) there must be a very large extent to which we are not intentional at all. This is 
because the objects we are using, in many cases, are not the intentional object and we are not 
fully aware of them. Husserl would agree that we are always fully aware (i.e. never marginally 
aware) of the intentional object but that the common assumption overlooks the vast complexity 
of intentionality. Hence there are many objects which bear intentionality in any one act. There is 
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only one intentional object but many of the subordinate or marginal type. Intentionality is not a 
laser like beam but a vast streaming web of intentionality.  
Now if there can be a breakdown between what is going on in mental acts which have 
real insight into the intentional objects of mental acts and our explanation of these acts, as was 
the case in mathematics, then surely it seems there would be a similar division between objects 
which are subordinate and our ability to provide an explanation of them. Thus, both the 
intentional objects and subordinate objects can be things which we are aware of (are intentional 
about in either the full sense or the subordinate sense) but this does not require that we have 
articulate reflection concerning them (this is doubly so for the marginal or subordinate objects).  
I am not here arguing that Husserl’s account of intentionality is better than Heidegger’s but only 
that a strict internalism does not necessarily follow from Husserl’s view.  
b. Problem Two: The intentionality Threshold    
 There is a further way in which Husserl’s theory can be divorced from necessitating a 
fairly traditional form of internalism. The previous section dealt with a specific aspects of 
Husserl’s theory (its non-lingocentrism and its complex view on intentionality), which offered 
some distance between it and many contemporary models of internalism. This section deals with 
the setting of the intentionality threshold (something which as far as the author is aware is not a 
part of Husserl’s theory) and how this setting is compatible with HW. However, one’s view of 
how it ought to be set can alter, without losing compatibility to HW, and subsequently allow for 
one’s theory to be more internalist or externalist.  
We made reference above to what we called “the intentionality threshold” let us now 
develop this idea more fully. We noted that for Heidegger the threshold delineates the shift from 
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a non-intentional state to an intentional one. For Husserl this threshold would delineate intentions 
which are “marginal” (and so “marginally” aware of them) from intentional states which are the 
full focus of our consciousness. Let us call the type of intentions that fall above this threshold 
(the intentions which are not marginal) first order intentionality. And let us call the type of 
intentions which fall below it second order intentionality. So, for example, when I awake in the 
morning and decide to get out of bed I have a first order intentionality towards the state of affairs 
“my being out of bed.” But some of the actions I make and their corresponding states of affairs 
(such as pulling at the covers and “not having the covers on me”) represent a second order 
intentionality.201  
Now the question that most concerns us here is “What determines the intentionality 
threshold, i.e. what determines whether I rise to first order intentionality or not?” For Heidegger 
the setting of the threshold was not something determined by the intentions of the agent. But 
rather by the circumstances the agent found themselves in. For Husserl though the setting of this 
threshold must be intentional. While Husserl’s view does not exclude factors external to the 
agent’s intentions from playing a role, such as skill (skill in the broad sense of the term which 
would include things like intelligence, coordination, strength, etc.) or environmental concerns, 
(e.g. difficulties due to the physical surroundings), the interference of other agents, etc., the 
fundamental setting of the threshold must be something set by the agent. Otherwise Husserl’s 
theory would at bottom be the same as Heidegger’s where intentionality is not the most basic  
                                                     
201 There are similar parallels to this development in Searle’s work which are attempted to be dealt with by 
Dreyfus. See Hubert Dreyfus, "Heidegger's Critique of the Husserl/Searle Account of Intentionality." Particularly 
Searle’s skier example ibid., 30.  
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form of existence in the world.202 The intentionality threshold is set intentionally then for 
Husserl. Two questions remain “Is the threshold set with a first order intentionality or a second 
order intentionality?” and “How ought it to be set?”  
i. How the Threshold is Set 
In regards to the first question, “Is the intentionality threshold set by a first or second 
order intention?” by means of a first order intention seems to be the correct answer to me. The 
answer to the question hinges on how one interprets the mental acts which have (as one of their 
parts) the setting of the threshold. Let us take tying one’s shoes for an example. This is 
something that we all start out unable to do and then, hopefully, learn to do. While in the process 
of learning we intend to tie our shoes. And these early attempts are certainly at the first order 
level of intentionality. Now though we tie our shoes “automatically,” “without thinking about it.” 
Most of us probably cannot recall an instance where we entertained and intended (first order) the 
thought “I’m not going to pay attention to tying my shoes anymore.”  At first the lack of this 
specific thought process might seem to indicate that the threshold is set by a side-effect of what 
we repeatedly intend on the first order level (thus becoming something which is “marginal” in 
our mental acts and so correspond to the second order level of intentionality). However, I think 
what might be our initial interpretation of this process is incorrect. What we are really intending 
in the beginning of these processes, like our example of shoe tying, is not “to tie our shoes” but 
“to learn to tie our shoes.” (The language above actually reflects this to some extent: “in the 
                                                     
202 Unfortunately whether Husserl or Heiddeger’s theory is better equipped to explain our own nature and 
our experiences of the world is something which lies outside of the domain of this paper. I should like to point out 
that I think Heidegger’s view will have problems when it comes to moral experiences and that it goes against what 
we experience about how we live and grow in the world. As far back as we can go in our minds we see ourselves 
able to do things, follow complex patterns of thought, focus on things, etc., on the second order level of 
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the train of thought, not be distracted, etc.  
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process of learning to tie our shoes.”)  This is to become shoetiers, persons who readily and 
easily tie shoes. And of course we realize that tying our shoes today and tomorrow, and so forth, 
is the means to our end. And intending to be shoetiers does not force us to hold that we never 
intend here and now to tie our shoes on the first order level (especially not while we are learning 
to tie them). But since we did first order intend to become shoetiers then upon becoming capable 
at tying our shoes we began to do this process on a second order level. The setting of the 
threshold then corresponds to the initial intention, first order intention to become shoetiers, and is 
so set by first order intentions.  
ii. How Should the Threshold be Set? 
Now one of the implications of the fact that the threshold is set intentionally is that it can 
be set correctly or incorrectly. To change examples, a person may go through the same process 
as the boy who learns to tie his shoes in learning to drive. And many intend to become capable 
drivers (persons who naturally and easily drive well). But because of pride, laziness, 
inobservance, etc., one may falsely take it to be the case that one is a capable driver. This hasty 
conclusion can, nevertheless, result in a shift at the intentionality threshold. Here we must 
remember Husserl’s account of knowledge given above and the concept of fulfillment. The 
situation which stood as a possible fulfillment for some person’s intentions, call him Jack, was 
his actually being a capable driver. And fulfillment of that intention is brought about when he 
finds himself to be as he intended. This is a direct parallel to Husserl’s account of knowledge. If 
Jack allows desire to outrun knowledge then he will take what is not a case of fulfillment to be 
an actual case of fulfillment. He will then begin to function below the threshold when driving. 
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This is a development of Willard’s claim that one of the dangers in human life is that our lives 
will run off of desire rather than knowledge.203  
The development of the intentionality threshold given has considered actions as opposed 
to beliefs (this was done because it seems easiest to understand in regards to actions). But the 
threshold is equally applicable to belief. In fact, no strong delineation should be made between 
its application in regards to action as opposed to belief. The strong connection between the 
thresholds application to action and belief and the parallels that we saw with Husserl’s theory of 
knowledge is precisely because of the strong connection between belief and action. As Willard 
says “Belief is the rails upon which our life runs.”204 And since the threshold is partially set on 
the basis of our beliefs (e.g. if we believe we are competent drivers then we will allow for certain 
actions to fall below the threshold) then we have a responsibility to ensure that our beliefs are 
based off of real insight rather than desire. As Willard says, “All of us bear a primary ethical 
responsibility to make sure that how we are speaking and thinking of things is as they are, that is 
that our thoughts and words are true.”205 All of this reinforces the normative aspect of the setting 
of the intentionality threshold but it does not answer the question of how it ought to be set.  
Husserl recognized that we often do not carry our thoughts through to a pure act of 
“seeing” but we assure ourselves, sometimes wrongly, that we could do so.206 At this point we 
should clearly get before our minds Husserl’s theory concerning knowledge and quoting Willard 
                                                     
203 See Dallas Willard, “The Genius of Jesus,” lecture given at Veritas Forum (Ohio State University 2002), 
7:30ff (particularly the comments around the 10:40 mark). This lecture is available for free at 
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is very helpful in this regard. “In the dispositional sense we “have” knowledge, are 
knowledgeable, when we are in a position or are qualified to actualize the path toward the re-
cognitive union of concept and object through perception (read as “an act of “seeing” ”) when we 
choose.”207  The intentionality threshold deals with this exact issue of how often should we 
“carry through to a pure act of perception” (that is how often we are supposed to re-actualize the 
path toward cognitive union). It is important to notice that knowledge is independent of this re-
actualization (and this independence alone makes HW more compatible with externalist theories 
than is normally thought).  
However, it should be noted that if the threshold is set too high, resulting in us being 
second order intentional more often then we ought to be, this will result in our never actualizing 
the union in the first place (such was the case in our example with Jack and becoming a 
competent driver). Therefore no matter how reliable one might be if there is never a point where 
fulfillment is actually brought about in act of “seeing” then one does not have knowledge. So 
while HW would be compatible with certain externalist theories it would not be compatible with 
a strict reliabilism like Goldman’s. Setting the threshold correctly makes sure that the union is 
actualized in the first place (without going so far as to require re-actualization of the union in 
every case).  Furthermore, how one holds that the threshold ought to be set in order to have 
knowledge will determine how internalist or externalist one is. The specific level of the threshold 
is not something that Husserl or Willard seem to address. HW then is compatible with different 
interpretations of how the threshold ought to be set.  
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D. Conclusion  
HW then is not strictly an internalist theory. It is open to certain externalist insights, such 
as Plantinga’s sensus divinitatis and HW shows a marked difference between it and the current 
lingocentrism of contemporary theories. Furthermore, marginal intentions and the intentionality 
threshold allow for a range of externalist or internalist theories to be accommodated by HW. 
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V. Closing 
A. Additional Insight Needed in Understanding Phenomenology 
The full application of Husserl’s theory and Willard’s understanding and application of it 
to the current state of affairs in epistemology has not been considered. This has been more of an 
introduction to and explanation of their theory and an argument for its application to the current 
situation in epistemology. This thesis has also tried to address the concern that HW is only 
compatible with internalist theories. Such a view would make HW single sided to its application 
in the current discussion and it would, at minimal, make it less likely to provide insight going 
forward in the internalist-externalist discussion. HW, however, has a far broader application than 
that.  Much more remains to be explored though in discussing HW and its application to current 
epistemology. The theory and implications of proximate and ultimate fulfillment has been 
largely untouched here in this paper. Also HW’s emphasis on the importance of noetic structures 
(which opens it up to some coherentist insights) has not been addressed. Husserl’s alignment 
with Aristotle in that knowledge is always of essences has been largely untouched. Much more 
can and needs to be explored on the phenomenological side of this discussion.  
B. Additional Insight Needed in Applying Phenomenology  
 Also much more needs to be said in applying phenomenology to current epistemology 
and reorienting the current discussion around phenomenology; nothing has been said here in this 
paper regarding Gettier problems or any other problem in current epistemology.  However, a 
reorienting of epistemology around phenomenological insight does not require a total dismissal 
of all the work done thus far nor does it promise to assuage all of the current problems (it is 
helpful here to be reminded of Willard’s pessimism concerning a full definition of knowledge). 
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Perhaps things like Gettier cases are reminders of this human limitation or perhaps 
Phenomenology will provide much needed insight here (please understand this “or” inclusively). 
The change in epistemology argued for here is meant to be like a blanket of snow falling over a 
vast landscape. Everything is changed but much remains fundamentally the same.  The same 
deep valleys and peaks still remain and are recognizable. Perhaps some peaks will now be even 
harder to climb. And perhaps some lakes easier to traverse. I expect many of the same epistemic 
puzzles will remain. Gettier problems and many other familiar faces from the world of epistemic 
troubles (Hopefully Davidson’s Swampman is cordial) re-emerge albeit in a different context (a 
phenomenological one and one in which we are armed with the additional tools of evidenz, 
“seeing,” the reductions, and important distinctions between types of immanence and 
clarification and explanation). Husserl did not see himself as putting an end to all of the 
questions but of offering a way forward in exploring “beautiful” and underdeveloped theories 
where “deep-going analysis is needed everywhere.”208 
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